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ABSTRACT
For the past 100 years, natural resource management in the United States has
reflected a belief that the top-down application of science to predict and control the
natural world will, in the words of Gifford Pinchot, the Nation's first head of the U.S.
Forest Service, "support the wise use of the earth and its resources for the lasting good of
men." However, over the past two decades, a growing number of critics have challenged
the technocratic optimism of this "conventional management", arguing that the public
should be more deeply engaged in the decision-making that drives natural resource
management and policy. Part of the rationale for this argument is based on the growing
recognition that Western, scientific management has discounted the value of local
ecological knowledge (LEK), a system of knowledge developed over time through
observation and interaction with the natural environment. Although advocates have
expounded the benefits of using LEK, in practice, LEK is rarely integrated into the
scientific assessments that drive management decisions.
To understand what affects whether or not LEK is incorporated into management
science, this thesis examines: 1. What are the particular barriers to integrating LEK into
management science? 2. When LEK is integrated into management science, why is it
used and how are specific barriers to its use overcome? These questions are addressed
through an intensive examination of two U.S. cases: the Sonoran Desert Conservation
Plan in Pima County, Arizona and the evolution of fishery management science in the
New England groundfishery. This study confirms academics and practitioners' claims
that a major barrier to incorporating LEK is a "language" divide: LEK is rarely presented
in scientific terms and thus it is difficult for scientists to understand its relevance or
confirm its accuracy. Furthermore, scientific studies are often too complex for untrained
locals to understand and thus engage with. However, this study also reveals that
conflicting interests and values between scientists and bearers of LEK are not only
common in resource management, but also significantly discourage knowledge exchange
by embedding risk in the very acts of eliciting and divulging LEK. Furthermore, although
individuals who are able "translate" between the local and scientific communities can
overcome the language divide, interest and value conflicts are rarely overcome by similar
translation. Instead, this analysis suggests that incentives must be created to encourage
the sharing and eliciting of LEK and outweigh the associated perceived risks.
Collaborative research programs in the New England fishery provide one such model.
Based on these findings, recommendations for improving knowledge sharing and
incorporating LEK into natural resource management are made.
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The next necessary thing.. .is neither the construction of a universal Esperanto-like
culture...nor the invention of some vast technology of human management.
It is to enlarge the possibility of intelligible discourse between people
quite different from one another in interest, outlook, wealth, and power,
and yet contained in a world where tumbled as they are into endless connection,
it is increasingly difficult to get out of each other's way.
-Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology
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INTRODUCTION
Local Ecological Knowledge: The Promise
For the past century, natural resource management in the United States has
reflected a belief that the top-down application of science to predict and control the
natural world will, in the words of Gifford Pinchot, the Nation's first U.S. Forest Service
head, "support the wise use of the earth and its resources for the lasting good of men"
(Pinchot, as cited in Ward 2000, 327). However, over the past two decades, a growing
number of critics, including many scientists, have challenged the technocratic optimism
of this "conventional management". They contend that conventional management has not
accomplished what it promised; it has not been able to sustain both the healthy
functioning of natural systems and humans' use of their resources. Instead, ecosystem
health is steadily declining: biodiversity continues to decrease and landscapes are
degraded, while conflict and litigation frequently overwhelm management decisions.
Critics fault conventional management for creating these conditions with policies that
overlook and are unresponsive to local social and ecological nuances and system
interrelationships and an undemocratic reliance on scientists to develop "rational"
solutions to environmental problems that inherently require the consideration of values
and equity (Ludwig 2000).
Many academics and activists now argue that the public should be more deeply
engaged in resource management decision-making (Backstrand 2000, Fischer 2000,
Walker 2002). Part of the rationale for this argument is based on the growing recognition
that Western, scientific management has discounted the value of local expertise-often to
the detriment of the unique social and ecological system being managed (Fischer 2000,
Scott 1998, Wynne 1996). Since anthropologists first began to study the knowledge
systems of indigenous cultures in the third world, it has become clear that many local
communities have extensive ecological expertise-a system of knowledge developed
over time through observation and interaction with the natural environment. Studies have
found that this local expertise, or "local ecological knowledge" (LEK), does not reside
only with indigenous communities, but also with non-indigenous, resource-dependent
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ones, such as farmers, ranchers, and fisherman, as well as observant individuals.
Proponents of integrating LEK into management's knowledge base have offered a three-
fold argument. They suggest that it can improve the understanding of local ecological and
social conditions, producing management decisions and policies that are more responsive
to these conditions, offer models of adaptive, sustainable resource use, and quell some of
the conflict and mistrust that arises when local expertise is ignored and discredited as
"anecdotal".
Thesis Questions and Methods
While much has been written about LEK in theory, some scholars have noted that
LEK is rarely used in practice (Huntington 2000), and others have argued: "the challenge
now is to move beyond the seeming preoccupation with theoretical issues to a substantive
engagement with the applied issues" (Davis and Wagner 2003). Indeed, there is a dearth
of literature related to the application of LEK in resource management, particularly in the
United States, where regulatory mandates present a very different arena for "using" LEK
than that of rural development in the third world--on which most LEK research has
focused. In the United States, numerous independent agencies, from the Environmental
Protection Agency to the United States Forest Service, are charged with regulating and
managing the U.S. environment. However, as Ozawa (1996) notes, even the oldest of
these agencies has been "built on the assumption that certain types of decisions ought to
(and could) be based on technical expertise, not politics." Since the early 1900s,
congressional legislation, directing and constraining agency rulemaking, has translated
this assumption into law; enabling statutes often require that agencies regulate using the
"best available science," while corresponding acts "make explicit reference to the
technical basis for decisions" (Ozawa 1996). Litigation and judicial review, which
frequently entails a "hard look" at the "rational" and evidentiary basis of regulations, has
further reinforced the need for agencies to support their rules with meticulous scientific
and technical arguments (Jasanoff 1995).
Thus, for LEK to be perceived as useful and legitimate for policy formation and
management rulemaking, LEK would have to be incorporated into a scientific
framework-one guided by established scientific methodology that, generally, entails
12
observing a phenomenon, formulating and testing hypotheses for the phenomenon, and
recording the process. This raises a host of largely uninvestigated, applied questions, two
of which I take up in this thesis: First, given the claim that LEK is rarely used in practice,
what is preventing scientists from using it? Specifically, what are the particular obstacles
to incorporating LEK into management science? Second, when LEK is used, why is it
used and when specific obstacles to its use are overcome, how and why does this occur?
I address these questions through an intensive examination of two case studies.
The first is the development of a conservation land system for the Sonoran Desert
Conservation Plan (SDCP) in Pima County, Arizona. The second is the evolution of
fishery management science in the New England groundfishery. I chose these cases for
several reasons. First, they exhibit similarities in several important dimensions. In both
cases management science purportedly drew on LEK, but, in each, scientists also
disregarded either a particular "type" of LEK or all LEK for some period of time. Both
cases concern regions of comparable size; and in both cases the relevant scientific studies
have been completed in the past few years, leaving some time for the dust (and heated
emotions) to settle. Furthermore, the cases are different in theoretically important ways.
They involve very different organizational and decision-making structures. In addition,
participants used opposite strategies to manage the potential politicization of the science:
in Pima County, scientists remained scientifically insulated, while fisheries scientists
embraced collaboration. These difference allowed me to explore some of the reasons
LEK, or certain types of LEK, was or was not used, what variables affected how it was
used, and what impacts it had--or participants perceived it to have-on the science.
Because LEK does not represent a codified system of knowledge, is rarely written
down, and may not be discussed in reports or papers, to answer my questions I drew
substantially on information revealed through semi-structured interviews. This was
particularly true for the SDCP, where I held hour -long interviews with twenty
representatives of all relevant parties, chosen through snowball sampling. Information
gleaned from interviews was confirmed through interviews with other participants, as
well as with other primary sources, such as technical documents and reports. The New
England fishery case, on the other hand, has of late become the poster child for the use of
LEK in U.S. resource management. To analyze this case, I relied more on documents,
such as scientific studies and reports, and secondary sources, which were more abundant
than for the SDCP. However, I also included semi-structured interviews with sixteen key
informants for methodological detail and personal perspectives that were not always
available in the formal documentation.
Road-Map
Through this thesis and the case study analysis in particular, I argue that, when it
is achieved, the incorporation of LEK into management science does provide the benefits
and impacts discussed in theory. However, I find there are two major obstacles to the
incorporation of LEK into resource management science, which, to be overcome, require
very different approaches. Confirming the literature on LEK, the first obstacle is a
"language" divide that frequently exists between scientists and bearers of LEK. In the
sense I use it, this language divide not only refers to the differences in the terminology
that scientists and locals may use, but also the potential differences in their
conceptualizations and representations of ecological systems and the methodologies they
use to learn about those systems. Put simply, this divide makes communication, and thus
knowledge sharing, between scientists and locals extremely difficult. It prevents scientists
from recognizing the relevance or accuracy of LEK, as LEK is seldom acquired or
presented scientifically. With limited time and research budget, scientists rarely can
afford to invest energy in understanding and confirming LEK, particularly when its
relevance or accuracy is uncertain. From the perspective of untrained locals, scientific
methods and assessments are often too complex and time-consuming to understand,
which stymies their attempts to engage productively in the research. The two cases,
however, suggest that an effective way of overcoming this language divide is through a
"translator." Such an individual is familiar with and operates in both the local and
scientific communities, perceives the relevance of certain LEK, and can facilitate its
incorporation into a scientific framework.
The second obstacle, I argue, is infrequently discussed in LEK literature and is
that of conflicting interests and values systems: it is not always that case that scientists
and the bearers of LEK have the same goals, priorities, and world views as relates to
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natural resources. In fact, in U.S. natural resource management this is often the case;
scientists are frequently precautionary and conservative in their assumptions and
recommendations, while the communities with the most extensive LEK are extractive
resources users, who are often more utilitarian in their values and also resistant to efforts
that might limit their use and extraction of the resource. The cases analysis shows how
knowledge sharing between scientific and local communities with conflicting interests
then becomes a potentially political, personal, and thus risk incurring, exercise. By
working with critics, or drawing on their LEK, scientists fear that their research will be
politicized and discredited. Furthermore, when resource users feel threatened by
scientists, due to conflicting interests, they are less likely to offer their LEK-
particularly if is sensitive information that later might be "used against them." I suggest
that the interest divide is far more difficult to bridge than the language divide and as risk
is embedded in the very acts of eliciting, divulging, and using LEK; it cannot be
overcome through an intermediary translator. Instead, it requires someone or some
institution to shift the pre-existing incentive structures-so that benefits of cross-
community work outweigh the associated risks.
I present this argument as follows: In the first two sections, "Enlightened
Management" and "Local Ecological Knowledge," I provide context for this thesis and
its two core questions. The first sections focus on the origins and ideologies of scientific
management and its influence on U.S. resource management. It also presents the critiques
of conventional management and the rationale for recent calls for public participation in
management science. The following section builds on this argument, and introduces one
form of this participation: the integration of local ecological knowledge (LEK). It reviews
research developments on LEK as well as current theories and literature that provide the
theoretical context for rest of the thesis.
I then present the first of two case studies: the development of a "Conservation
Land System" (CLS) in Pima County, Arizona. This case demonstrates how scientists
were able to design a more accurate CLS by incorporating the LEK of individuals with
varying levels of connection to the scientific community. However, the case also shows
how scientists determined what LEK was useful and credible by defining an expert
community, based on a shared scientific language as well as common conservation
interests and values. Through the scientists' interaction with non-expert bearers of LEK,
the case shows how language and interests presented challenges to LEK's integration
with management science. Finally, it shows how expert translators were able to bridge
the language divide between the scientific and local communities, but also shows that the
risks associated with conflicting interests, as seen in the scientists' interaction with local
ranchers, cannot be overcome through translation.
The second case study, "The New England Groundfishery," examines role of
LEK in fishery management throughout the latter part of the 1900s, as groundfish stocks
in the Gulf of Maine declined precipitously. The case demonstrates how advancements in
fishery science and technology and increasingly precautionary science and rulemaking,
created both a language and interest divide between fishermen and scientists that
prevented fishermen's LEK from being incorporated into management science. The case
further shows how these divides have been, and are being, bridged. As seen in the Pima
County case study, this case demonstrates that an individual with a foot in both the local
and scientific world can act as a translator between the two communities' knowledge
bases. However, unlike in Pima County case, this case also begins to provide a model for
how interest conflicts between scientists and locals can be overcome through the example
of collaborative research initiatives, which have provided incentives for collaboration and
aligned scientists and fishermen's goals in joint research projects.
In Chapter Six, I reiterate my finding, discuss their implications, and make policy
recommendations for how LEK might elicited and incorporated more effectively into
natural resource management.
ENLIGHTENED MANAGEMENT
Questioning Convention
In 1993, Ludwig et al. published an innocuously titled article, "Uncertainty,
Resource Exploitation, and Conservation: Lessons from History" in the prestigious
Science magazine. Six years earlier the Brundtland commission had established
"sustainability"1 as the new development and resource management paradigm, and
scientists were already scrambling to put the concept on a "sound scientific footing"
(Lele and Norgaard 1996). Citing management failures, from depleted fisheries to
agricultural environmental disasters, Ludwig and his coauthors rejected the premise that
scientists could provide answers to the environmental problems that faced society or
dictate the path to sustainability, as many policy makers were asking them to do.
The article hit a nerve. The New York Times covered it ('Biologists Fear
Sustainable Yield is Unsustainable") and the journal Ecological Applications dedicated
an entire issue to reactions from the ecological community. Some scientists responded
warily, cautioning against "throw[ing] the research baby out with the gridlock
bathwater," pointing out that science is essential to environmental problem solving and
should not be dismissed (Policansky 1993). But, at its core, Ludwig's article was not
arguing against the value of science, but against a Western ideology that had privileged
technical know-how to the exclusion of other forms of knowledge, squelched democratic
debate with scientific reasoning and solutions, and attempted to manage uncertain natural
systems with false precision. And, if the response from the ecological community was
any sign, many scientists were beginning to agree: the conventional approach to
management wasn't working.
Sustainability, in the context of development, recognizes that social and economic well-being operate
within the environmental well-being. It is not a purely an environmental concept - indeed its vision is to
"explicitly link science with a moral framework rooted in the tenet of intergenerational equality" (Sarewitz
2000), which made attempts to strictly translate it into "definitions, criteria, and indices" was, to many, all
the more baffling (Lele and Norgaard 1996).
The Enlightenment and "High Modernism"
The ideology that Ludwig et al. (1993) implicitly references can be traced back
nearly three hundred years in Western history. It is generally agreed to have arisen in the
Enlightenment, the philosophical and intellectual movement of 1 8th century Europe and
America, which is itself closely linked to the Age of Reason (1 7th century) and the
Scientific Revolution. During these centuries, great scientific minds like Galileo, Kepler,
Newton, and Leeuwenok, the father of microbiology, used developing telescopic
technology to study the planets; mathematically described the motion of orbiting bodies;
established fundamental natural laws, such as gravity; and uncovered the existence of
microorganisms with powerful new microscopes.
Enlightenment thinkers sought to combine these advances in science and
technology with the power of the rising nation-state. The ideology was most pronounced
in the writings of Auguste Comte, who argued that the only authentic form of knowledge
was acquired through scientific methodology, as well as Saint-Simon, who envisioned a
technocracy, in which scientists, above and removed from the messiness of the political
process, would lend their knowledge to "those most capable of steering humanity's
progress toward the new industrial order: engineers entrepreneurs, and banker-financers
who would build it; the artists writers and musicians who would serve as its ideologues;
and the political leaders who would wield their baton over the whole ensemble"
(Friedman 1987, 52).
The anthropologist James Scott refers to this technocratic ideology as "high
modernism" (Scott 1998). He describes it as "a faith that borrowed, as it were, the
legitimacy of science and technology. It was, accordingly, uncritical, unskeptical, and
thus unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of
human settlement and production" (Scott 1998, 4). Although some high modernist
visions have a distinctly elitist, if not outright authoritarian, bent, the faith itself (in the
cooperation of expert knowledge with government power to improve the human
condition) is not necessarily undemocratic. In theory, the so-called experts are
subordinate to the political process, so their power is always checked by the people
(Fischer 2000, Brint 1994). However, when this check is removed- when the expert
analysis is privileged as the only authentic knowledge or vision-and the government
uses its power to see this vision through, high modernism becomes more troubling for
several reasons.
First, if expert-driven, "rational administration" supplants political deliberation,
then the "politician [becomes] at best something like a stopgap" (Habermas 1970, 64).
Thus, in addition to being excluded from the deliberations of "experts," citizens cannot
exercise political influence through their elected officials. Not only does such governance
oppose the tenets of a representative democracy-elected officials acting in the people's
interests-as Fischer (2000, 14) argues, it also "opens the door to increasingly
sophisticated forms of expertocracy that offer fewer and fewer opportunities for
meaningful public deliberation."
Second, part of what has made the scientific approach to knowledge production so
incisive is a "reductionist" conceptualization of the world. That is, the scientific approach
often takes as a given that any system can be decomposed into an array of its fundamental
elements and processes. To uncover what these elements and processes are, and how they
influence the system, scientists apply the "scientific method" to rigorously test
conjectures about how the system components work. In theory, knowledge is derived
through reason and objective analysis, and its legitimacy is premised on its ability to be
falsified (Popper 1965). Therefore, the reductionist approach requires reducing "reality
into describable component parts" and decontextualizing these components (i.e. ignoring
"processes of interaction") to reveal system understandings or "laws of nature" that are
independent of place and time (Sarewitz and Pielke 2000). Although these qualities of
reductionism have allowed humans to develop knowledge and technologies that were
previously unimaginable, when reductionist science has been unskeptically applied with
the utilitarian interest of controlling the complex natural world, these very same qualities
frequently have become liabilities.
Germanic Scientific Forestry: A Disaster in Reductionism
There are numerous examples throughout history where the top-down application
of reductionist science to "better" society has failed miserably. One case, recounted by
Scott (1998), begins in Prussia and Saxony in the late 1 8 th century, at the origin of
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scientific forestry. At this time, the application of scientific knowledge to the harvesting
of wood was part of a larger scheme to "reduce the fiscal management of the kingdom to
scientific principles that would allow systemic planning" (Scott 1998, 14). Before
scientific forestry methods were introduced, harvesting was a disorganized and inefficient
affair: the forest maps were incomplete or outdated, it was very difficult to locate to the
most valuable trees, and some of the most economically important stands were being
degraded. As the resources became scarcer, officials sought to organize the process.
With the utilitarian interest of achieving the highest sustained yield (what in modem
management is termed a "maximum sustained yield"), forest scientists surveyed, tagged
and transformed the forest trees into tables for measurement and calculation. Taking the
scientific approach even further, whole new forests were planned and planted-many in
place of older, mixed-species forests-to further simplify the practice, allowing greater
control and maximization of output. A linear matrix of only commercially valuable trees
were planted; a narrow vision of the forest, which excluded all elements outside the
managers' immediate interest, was created in flesh. Anything disruptive of this
uniformity, such as underbrush, fire, or "local populations", was perceived as a threat to
management. As Scott (1998) also notes, this regimentation did more than make
calculations easier; it facilitated centralization of management by removing the need for
"discretion," based on experiential knowledge built up over time, which managers and
harvesters relied on to maneuver in the old growth forests. In this way, "relatively
unskilled and inexperienced labor crews could adequately carry out its tasks by following
a few standard rules..." (Scott 1998, 18).
At first the program worked beautifully, producing the predicted high yield of
timber, while reducing harvesting effort; all of which reinforced the foresters' efforts. But
after the first 100 years (essentially the first rotation) insects, fire, and poachers, some of
the natural and social elements that managers had tried to keep out, had crept back in.
And the very successful exclusion of other elements, such as detritus and non-
commercial species, actually made the forest weaker. Lack of ground litter decreased the
occurrence of certain plants, animals, and microorganisms essential to soil building and
nutrient cycling, and the homogeneity of the species meant that if several trees acquired a
disease or parasite, the entire forest was put at risk. Furthermore, adverse weather-
storms, drought, floods-whose effect would be dampened in a diverse forest, had far
more destructive consequences in the monoculture. In some cases, this severely lowered
productivity; in others, the result was massive tree death (Scott 1998).
Although the birth of German scientific forestry is an extreme example (and in
retrospect, the science may look very naive), it illuminates the potential trouble in top-
down applications of reductionist science to control complex natural systems. The forest
was simplified; the elements of commercial interest were decontextualized; and the local
nuances, which actually made the forest function, were lost. The scientific forestry
program initially succeeded in maximizing production, "ultimately, however, its
emphasis on yield and paper profits, its relatively short time horizon, and, above all, the
vast array of consequences it had resolutely bracketed came back to haunt it" (Scott 1998,
21).
U.S. Resource Management and the Enlightenment Program
Even as the environmental and economic costs of projects such as Germany's tree
farming became apparent, the ideologies of Enlightenment thinking remained extremely
persuasive and influential. In the U.S., they cast a long shadow over resource
management, which became a serious concern in the late 1890s as expansion and
settlement gave way to intensive and unregulated resource use. Degradation of forests,
range and agricultural lands as well as severe over-hunting of wildlife spawned the first
conservation movement, in which early modernist ideals were given new life in the vision
of Gifford Pinchot. The nation's first professional forester, Pinchot trained in France at a
school that followed German forestry techniques and curriculum (Scott 1998). On his
return to the States and subsequent appointment as first head of the Forest Service,
Pinchot articulated a "wise use", utilitarian ethic, reminiscent of the early German
foresters. On forestry, he wrote:
[it] is tree farming.. .to make the forest produce the largest possible
amount of whatever crop or service will be most useful, and keep on
producing it for generation after generation. The forest, rightly handled-
given the chance- is, next to the earth itself, the most useful servant of
man (Pinchot 1910, as cited in Meine 1995, 11).
Pinchot's brand of conservation characterized nature as something "to be.. .actively
manipulated by scientifically informed experts to improve and sustain yield. How then, to
live on a piece of land without spoiling it? By strengthening the oversight role of
government, enacting science-based regulations and resource management practices..."
(Meine 1995, 12).
By the 1930s, the young science of ecology was demonstrating that the natural
world was not merely a "collection of.. .useful, useless, and noxious species arrayed upon
an elemental landscape of soils and waters. Rather it was a vast, intricately organized and
tightly integrated system" (Calicott 1991, as cited in Meine, 21). Such developments
spurred some managers to argue for a new, interdisciplinary approach to natural resource
management. However, before such concepts could take root in the agencies, World War
II and the Cold War intensified and entrenched the early high modernist visions. Through
World War II, science and technology had become a military, thus government,
enterprise and at the war's end it continued to be-not only in terms of providing
weaponry, but also as a font of knowledge and expertise to sustain U.S. military and
geopolitical dominance (Sarewitz 2000). In 1945, Vannevar Bush's report to Roosevelt,
Science, The Endless Frontier, encapsulated the technocratic optimism of the era and its
new vision for science, governance, and society. In it, he laid out a top-down organization
for science, with more responsibilities to and support from government, impacts on all
levels of government, and benefits that would span society. The U.S. program for science
that congealed during the Cold War has been termed the "Enlightenment program" for
good reason, as it "prescribed the linking of scientific knowledge about the laws of nature
to the technological control of nature of itself for the benefit of and progress of
humanity" (Sarewitz 2000).
In resource management, the widespread faith in technology was internalized in
practice. The methods (so-called "conventional management") employed across
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and range management reflected the confidence in using
science and technology to meet the needs of a burgeoning post-war population.
Management relied on large-scale, technological fixes, applied with an intense, tunnel-
visioned focus:
... to improve agricultural productivity, expand and intensify farm
operations using fertilizers and pesticides, a limited number of "modem"
seed varieties, and an ever growing array of "labor-saving" technologies;
to improve range forage production, remove woody vegetation, apply
herbicides, and seeds with more "desirable" forage species; to build up
stocks of fish and game, introduce exotic species and expand artificial
propagation programs (Meine 1995).
Other strategies included the calculations and enforcement of a maximum sustainable
yield-a certain number of species or amount of a resource to be withdrawn in a
sustained fashion over a certain time period; in the case of wildlife protection,
management focused on reducing predators to levels that would support a rebound in
another population of interest and value. In turn, this required simplifying the natural
environment: narrowing the focus to only several species and indices of interest. In the
process, other essential elements, such as the impacts of habitat quality, spatial and
temporal scales, and other inter-species linkages, were ignored. The management
foundation laid by Pinchot grew stronger and the original technocratic vision narrowed
even further, and was reified in related agency mandates, policies, and laws, which
required, for example, that management decisions be based on "best available" science.
The pre-war interest in holistic, interdisciplinary management vanished from the scene.
Legacy of the Enlightenment Program in U.S. Resource Management
As in 1930s, dissenters rose up in the latter part of the century to challenge the
technocratic status quo. In the field of resource management, by the late 1980s and early
1990s the cracks in the system were beginning to spring leaks (Miller 1985, Lele and
Norgaard 1996). While the utilitarian "maximization" objective of management is now
being replaced with the supposedly more environmentally protective goal of
"sustainability", the tools and ideologies of enlightenment era management have proved
largely resistant to forces of change. However, conventional management is failing on a
number of fronts.
Conventional management rests on a three major assumptions, of which all have
been called into question. The first is that reductionist science can decompose the inner
workings of natural systems, and managers can, and should, apply the resulting
knowledge to predict and control nature. As the science of ecology (and related fields,
like systems biology, landscape ecology, conservation biology, and so forth) has
developed, what has become most clear is not how nature works, but how very complex it
is, and how naive the dream of reducing it to its supposed fundamental parts (Williams
1997). Furthermore, at the large scales at which management works, the top-down
application of scientific knowledge and "universal" principles has often forced a very
problematic and deleterious simplification of the unique system being managed. In this
way, local nuances, interrelationships, and inherent scientific and system uncertainty are
overlooked or simply ignored.
A second assumption is that the management issues facing society are purely
scientific and technical in nature. Pretending for a moment that science could lift nature's
veil and reveal its inner workings, conservation and management challenges cannot be
reduced to a biological or economic calculus. They are political, economic, and social,
and thus ineluctably linked to values, equity, and social justice (Ludwig 2000). There are
very human decisions to be made in establishing goals, priorities, and weighing trade-
offs. Take the concept of sustainability; As Lele and Norgaard (1996) point out, any
meaningful definition of sustainability must define "1. What is to be sustained and at
what scale, and in what form? 2. Over what time period and what level of certainty? 3.
Through what social process and with what trade-offs against other social goals?"
Although science is critical to informing such decision-making, over the past century
policy makers have essentially asked scientists and their science to supplant the
democratic deliberation that these problems demand, and to depoliticize issues and
decisions that are inherently political.
Third, conventional management assumes that the natural sciences used to make
and justify management decisions are objective, rational, and apolitical. However, to
further complicate matters, science has been revealed to be something less than a purely
objective, value-free inquiry. In the face of uncertainty, scientists' models of the world
must be a combination of well-understood knowledge (with general scientific consensus)
and other informed, but subjective "guesses" (Lele and Norgaard 1996). Indeed, at
nearly all levels of the scientific process, judgments are made regarding which methods
and assumptions to use, as well as how to interpret the results. While scientists may strive
to be objective, many of these choices cannot help but be personal, related to discipline,
values, social position, even gender (Lynn 1986, Zuckerman 1988).
Due in part to these flawed assumptions, conventional management has been
unable to stem the steady decline of environmental quality and ecological services.
Furthermore, the exclusivity of conventional management's decision-making processes
has often failed to produce the voluntary compliance that its policies depend on. Instead,
science-based management has engendered public backlash and political gridlock. As
both the language and methods of science have become more sophisticated and less
accessible to the layperson, opportunities for non-experts (i.e. the majority of citizenry) to
inform decision-making are increasingly limited. As Fichser (2000, 18) notes there is a
"subtle, apolitical form of authoritarianism in this technocratic strategy. When... expert
solutions are legitimated as rational, efficient, and enlightened, it is not easy for their
unwilling recipients to resist their application."
Although it may not be "easy", those impacted by but excluded from management
decision-making have developed methods of resistance. One highly successful approach
is to attack, challenge, and manipulate "the scientific understanding of the problem"
(Layzer 2006). Science becomes one of the few legitimate-and often most powerful-
bargaining chips available, and advocates who disagree with the implications and
interpretations of the science exploit scientific uncertainty; they present rivaling data and
experts who will challenge the science, often in court (Murphy 1991, Noss and
Cooperrider 1994). In short, a dispute over scientific uncertainty is a surrogate for an
underlying value debate "about the preservation of the environment and the distribution
of benefits of industrialization" (Sarewitz 2000).
Management science is also frequently rejected or resisted by the people "on the
ground"- by the ranchers or the fisherman who use the land and water-for another
reason: it is at odds with their own understanding of the natural system (Weeks and
Packard 1997). Those who promote conventional management on the basis of its
technocratic authority, tacitly presume that scientific knowledge is the pinnacle of human
knowledge and that other forms of know-how that are not derived or confirmed through
scientific methods, are more "primitive" or irrational, and therefore less legitimate and
even useless to management. Therefore, many scientists and policy makers attribute
arguments over the validity of management science to "misunderstanding." They adopt
what has been termed a "deficit model:" the users are confused and don't understand the
science; they propose public education in science as a remedy (Petts and Brooks 2005).
Misunderstanding should never be ruled out. However, in many cases certain
communities have legitimate disagreements with the science and even more accurate
understandings of the local system, but are written off as ignorant, leading to divisive
conflicts and misguided management (Wynne 2000).
LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
Civic Science
Given the environmental, social, and political problems incurred by conventional,
scientific management, some academics and activists argue that to improve decision-
making, public participation in science-in problem formulation, selection of
methodology, and interpretation of results-is essential. For example, Backstrand (2000)
urges that environmental decision-making be "refrained to include the triangular
interaction between scientific experts, policy-makers, and citizens."
The term "civic science" has developed as an umbrella term for whole range of
participatory approaches to science, whose goals, methods, and outcomes are variable
(Backstrand 2000). On one end of the spectrum, civic science is an attempt to increase
public understanding of science, or open up its methods for citizen review and scrutiny.
On the other end of the spectrum, it is citizens and members of a community actually
engaging in research. In "participatory research," community members work as equals
with practitioners to define what the problem is, what methods will be used to address it,
how the data will be analyzed and interpreted, and how the results will be used (Fischer
2000).
It is difficult to trace the citizen science movement to any one origin. In the third
world, it developed reactively against the imposition of western technologies over the
past half-century. It is part of a larger resistance to a forced "modernization" that has
been detrimental to the environmental, economic, and social fabric of many rural
communities. In this context, civic science, and participatory research more specifically,
is a tool for challenging dominant expertise, shifting the balance of power, and producing
knowledge that is relevant to a community's needs (See: Sillitoe et al. 2002).
In industrialized nations there are have been similar movements with similar
motivations. A large number of these cases are in the field of epidemiology, the study of
how and why disease is distributed in human populations (Corburn 2003, Corburn 2002,
Fischer 2000). One of the best-known cases of U.S. participatory research, recounted in
the book "A Civil Action," occurred in the late 1970s, in Woburn, Massachusetts.
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Perceiving a link between toxic waste that had contaminated several of the town's
drinking wells and high levels of leukemia, a number of residents began to map cancer
clusters to demonstrate a connection. The effort eventually led the citizens to an
interested Harvard biostatistician and together they designed a study that statistically
established a connection between leukemia levels and toxic exposure. Although the
results of their investigation came under fire because of their "unorthodox methodology,"
the study bolstered a successful civil lawsuit against two companies (Fischer 2000, 155).
However, participation in science takes time, resources, and requires answering a
whole host of methodological questions (e.g. Who participates? How are decisions made?
How are conflicts handled?) So, why do it?
First, its proponents argue that citizen participation "gives meaning to the practice
of democracy" as opposed to just paying it "lip service" (Fischer 2000, 243). Related to
this, is that participation can allow scientific uncertainty and trade-offs to be dealt with
collectively, as opposed to leaving them only to the judgment of one expert or expert
community.
Second, citizen participation in science may help restore the credibility of
scientific expertise, which, as noted, has increasingly come under public attack.
Backstrand (2003) provides the example of European efforts to patch relations between
scientists and the European public (tarnished after the mad cow disease outbreak and
concern over genetically modified foods) by enhancing "transparency, civil participation,
dialogue and accountability in science and policy."
A third, and key, argument recognizes that citizens not only have a right to help
determine their future, but, as mentioned, they may also be sources of valuable, place-
based knowledge. Although, as Fischer (2000, 195) says, "thanks to the modem
commitment- if not obsession with- the wonders of science and technology, local
knowledge has come to be ignored," many are arguing that this knowledge can
complement and contribute to expert understanding of environmental problems.
The recent "rediscovery" of local knowledge, particularly as it relates to the
environment (termed "local ecological knowledge," or LEK), is causing a stir in resource
management and its related scientific disciplines (Berkes and Folke 2000). But what
exactly is local knowledge and LEK, and how can it change the way we understand and
manage our environment?
Discovering Local Knowledge
Imagine an indigenous2 cultivator in Mexico, before the introduction of "modem"
agricultural technologies-pesticides, herbicides or lab engineered seeds. In order to
survive, he requires an extensive personal bank of knowledge, techniques, and skills.
Through years of experimentation with and observation of his seed varieties, soils, and
climate, he has techniques for growing crops that are well adapted to the local and
variable conditions. He knows how to adjust his approach when rainfall patterns change
or temperatures fluctuate. Furthermore, he may have many fields to manage, each unique
in terms of slope, orientation, altitude, or soil quality. In each of these fields he may plant
different seed varieties, or combinations of crops with synergistic effects, or employ
different planting patterns that they are well suited to the unique field conditions. With
each growing season, he learns more and develops new farming approaches (adapting old
ones and incorporating new methods), to increase both dependability and output. And
what he learns is not only stored in his mind, but may also be shared and swapped with
other farmers in the community, creating a community databank of farming practices,
that is rarely written down, but continuously drawn upon and modified.
This picture-of the complex nature of knowledge in what were once considered
"primitive" cultures-is a generalization of the one that was emerging in 1960s, as
anthropologists began to investigate the knowledge bases of rural communities, primarily
in the third world. At this time, many government modernization schemes were premised
on the belief that these communities were operating with knowledge that was "inefficient,
inferior, and an obstacle to development," and had to be converted to practices blessed by
government agencies and their scientific experts (Agrawal 1995, Geiser 2002). Indeed,
an outcome of this perspective was the so-called Green Revolution. Sponsored by the
Rockefeller Foundation in the 1940s, and later through the Ford Foundation and national
governments, the goal of the Green Revolution was to bring Western agro science and
technology, in the form of bio-engineered seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and
mechanization, to developing nations to increase crop yields. In these strategies, the local
knowledge of the targeted community was left, quite "unscientifically," uninvestigated
(Scott 1998); in fact, it is unclear if outsiders even imagined that it could exist.
At the same time, anthropologists' studies were demonstrating that these
communities not only had an extensive armory of techniques and knowledge bases, but
they were often more efficient and practical than the ones that were being imposed by
outsiders. Drawing on the sociologist Jan Douwe Van der Ploeg's study of indigenous
potato cultivation in the Andes, Scott (1998) compares the two models-the technocratic
and the local-and their logics. On the technocratic, Scott (1998, 302) writes:
The logic of the process-a logic not even remotely realized on the
ground- is to transform the farmers into "standard" farmers growing the
standard genotype [seed variety] on similar soils and leveled fields and
according to the instructions printed right on the seed packets, applying
the same fertilizers, pesticides, and amounts of water. It is a logic of
homogenization and virtual elimination of local knowledge. To the degree
that this homogenization is successful, the genotype will likely succeed in
the short run. Conversely, to the degree that such homogenization is
impossible, the genotype will fail.
While scientific agriculture begins with a model of the "ideal" plant type, and sets about
determining how to mold the environment to support this ideal, the process of the local
farmer, who takes the natural environment as his starting point, is quite the reverse:
The logic of actual farming is one of an inventive, practiced response to a
highly variable environment... cultivation in the Andes is a "craft". The
cultivator begins with an exceptionally diverse local ecology and aims at
adapting to it and gradually improving it. The Andean farmers' skills have
allowed them to achieve results that are quite respectable in terms of
narrow productionist goals and extraordinarily so in terms of yields and
sustainability (Scott 1998, 301).
Similarly, in a more recent study of traditional English sheep farmers in the
aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant meltdown, Wynne (1996) found
that the government scientists charged with crafting policy and recommendations for the
sale and grazing of the North England sheep developed their models and experiments
30
assuming that the standardization of nature and farming was "natural" (like the
agroscientists in the above example), and that their methods could represent realistic
farming practices. However, by not integrating the sheep-farmers' expertise, many of the
scientists' assumptions were completely wrong: They conducted contamination
experiments by penning in sheep, which was something the farmers would never do, and
they made management recommendations that the natural system could not handle, such
as encouraging farmers to graze their sheep longer on less contaminated pastures, which
would have led to desertification and erosion. These errors were all obvious to the sheep
farmers, one of whom commented: "You just wonder what the hell are these blokes [the
scientists] talking about?.. .what do this lot know about anything? If it weren't so serious
it would make you laugh" (Wynne 1996). However the scientists implicitly regarded the
farmers' knowledge of the local natural system and their own practices within it as
useless and ignored it. Thus not only were the scientists' recommendations frequently
based on a misunderstanding of the natural and social system, but they also failed to help
the farmers productively deal with the radiation, and instead bred anger and mistrust
among the local community (Wynne 1996).
The intent in comparing these scientific and "local" understandings of
environmental issues is not only to critique the imposition of scientific management, but
also point out how deeply mistaken and problematic the assumptions about its
"beneficiaries" have been. The continuing work of anthropologists and others have
revealed that many communities with deep connections to their local environment have
complex knowledge systems, techniques, and skills-not only in the realm of
agriculture-but related to many aspects of their natural surroundings.
Defining and Understanding Local Ecological Knowledge
The term local ecological knowledge (LEK) refers to a "wide array of practical
skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing environment"
(Scott 1998, 313). To clarify what can be a confusing assortment of ill-defined and
related terms: a community has an extensive suite of place-based knowledge, related to
their customs, beliefs, practices, economies, and so forth; this has been termed "local
knowledge." Local ecological knowledge is a subset of this general local knowledge and
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pertains exclusively to the local environment. The term "indigenous," or "traditional,"
ecological knowledge is commonly used to refer to the LEK held by indigenous groups.
However, because non-indigenous, resource dependent communities (Canadian herring
fishermen, for example) (Huntington 2000), individuals who do not belong any definable
"community" (Yli-Pelkonen and Kohl 2005) and even those who are part of a local
scientific or "expert" community (Fazey 2006a, Robertson and McGee 2003) can also be
bearers of extensive local ecological knowledge, LEK is here used as an umbrella term.
LEK is developed through intimate experience, observation, and adaptation in a
single environment and culture, and thus is deeply context dependent and can be linked to
cultural beliefs and customs (Berkes and Folke 1998); it is rarely applicable elsewhere.
While scientific knowledge is often concerned with large-scale processes and
generalizable trends, LEK is, by definition, place specific and often quite detailed.
However, LEK is not "closed" or "stagnant," as it is sometimes characterized. It is in fact
very responsive to new ideas, methods, and technologies introduced from the outside-
adopting those that seem to work and shunning those that do not (Agrawal 1995, Scott
1998). What is learned is typically internalized and communicated orally-hardly ever
written down. Depending on the history of the community or individual, LEK may
represent knowledge amassed over hundreds, if not thousands of years. However, it may
be richer in some areas than others. For example, Sillitoe (1996) found that the Wola
community in New Guinea had extremely complex knowledge of sweet potato varieties,
whereas their knowledge of geology was quite limited.
Some scientists have attempted to breakdown LEK into specific categories, which
together form a "knowledge system that is unique from Western science" (Davis and
Wagner 2003). For example, resource users or observant individuals and communities
may have "location specific knowledge": knowledge about where species occur, details
on species' lifecycles and habitat requirements, climate and seasonal patterns, hydrology,
and geomorphology (Stevenson 1996, Drew 2005).
Furthermore, because some communities, particularly resource dependent ones,
need to be aware of interconnections between species or certain processes, they also have
knowledge of "environmental linkages" in an ecosystem (Stevenson 1996, Drew 2005).
This includes knowledge of how their interaction with the environment impacts certain
communities or processes. For example, a fisherman may have an understanding of how
his practice of otter trawling (dragging a net along the bottom of the ocean floor) for
groundfish affects the sea bed, and how this in turn impacts the local lobster population
that rely on this habitat for protection during maturation. Or, a hill sheep-farmer may
understand what intensities of grazing are detrimental to his pastures' ecological
integrity, and how to "rest" them to prevent desertification. In his investigation of how
indigenous LEK (traditional ecological knowledge) could be incorporated into Canadian
environmental impact assessments, Stevenson (1996) terms this type of knowledge "level
2" knowledge, because it is "less accessible and comprehensible in terms of.. .Western
systems of knowledge" than "location specific knowledge" (Figure 1).
Traditional Ecological Knowledge
Specific Knowledge of Code of Ethics
Knowledge 4-1 Ecosystem 4 Governing
of Environment Relations Ecosystem
Relations
Level 1 Level 2
FIGURE 1. Components of traditional ecological knowledge. Level 2 components are more
complex and less likely to be incorporated into conventional environmental assessments and
management than Level 1 components. (Adapted from Stevenson 1996)
Just as LEK can be richer in some areas than others (potatoes versus geology), the
same holds true for its distribution in a community: some members of a community are
far more knowledgeable than others, because of experience, exclusivity, or innate skill.
These individuals may also possess what has been termed "expert experiential
knowledge" (Fazey et al. 2006b). Thus in addition to having substantial knowledge of
location specific information or ecological linkages, they have an expertise that cannot
always be "reduced to isolated facts or propositions" (Fazey et al. 2006b). Research on
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chess masters provides a useful analogy (deGroot 1965, as cited in Fazey et al. 2006b). In
the 1960s, when scientists attempted to compare master chess players to very good
players, they could find "no difference between the two groups in the number of moves
they thought they could make or the number of counter moves they anticipated from their
opponents. The experts [chess players] however, appeared to 'chunk' pieces of
information together allowing them to recognize features and patterns not noticed by the
other players." In this same way, locals with ecological expertise "may be able to
recognize emergent properties and make good predictions [about an environment], even
though they may not be able to explain precisely how they do it" (Fazey et al. 2006b).
Local Ecological Knowledge and Natural Resource Management
Since the social scientist Robert Chambers first argued it to the international
development community in 1979, the idea that local people "know" has now gained wide
acceptance in rural development circles and been demonstrated in numerous studies
(Geiser 2002). Over the past decade, many in resource management and related scientific
fields have begun to take note (Neis et al. 1999, Berkes et al. 2000, Huntington 2000,
Drew 2005, Bart 2006). Proponents of using LEK to inform management suggest that it
can improve understanding of natural systems and their links to social systems, provide
models of management that are "sustainable" (i.e. they allow humans to use resources
while operating within the constraints imposed by a resilient and healthy natural system),
and, improve relationships and trust among communities, scientists, and policymakers.
Because biologic scientific data is often patchy and fragmented, Berkes et al. (2000)
argue that LEK can fill in some of these gaps and improve the overall understanding of
local ecosystems and human interaction with these systems. For example, in the
management of certain wildlife populations, accurate and comprehensive data on harvest
rates and practices, habitat, migration patterns, and population size are essential to
modeling how the system works and assisting in management decisions; LEK can assist
in developing more accurate models of the population dynamics and the relevant natural
and social systems (Gilchrist 2005).
Along the same vein, in many cases LEK might provide the only historical picture
of certain ecosystems. It can help establish historical environmental "baselines" (e.g.
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prior species abundance), against which current changes can be measured, as well as
explain what natural and social changes have taken place within an environment over
time. This type of historical information is crucial to illuminating how environments have
transformed, and to developing explanations for why that transformation has occurred
(Bart 2006). And if one can understand what caused undesirable change then it may be
possible to establish a management strategy to improve conditions. For example, if one
can understand what precipitated a population crash, one is in a better position to develop
management approaches to successfully rebuild the species.
In addition to expanding the management knowledge base (both current and
historical), LEK can challenge and sometimes correct scientific paradigms. A good case
of this is the Bowhead Whale census in Alaska (see: Huntington 2000). In 1977 an
international ban was placed on the hunting of Bowhead whales, a tradition of the
Alaskan Eskimos. In response to the political backlash, scientists agreed to establish a
hunting quota based on a census of the whale population. They developed population
estimates by observing passing whales from cliffs along their migration path. The
Eskimos, however, challenged the estimates, arguing that the scientists' assumptions
were flawed. First, the scientists assumed that the whales only traveled within sight of the
observation cliffs, and second, that when ice blocked the migration route, they no longer
passed. The Eskimos, who traditionally traveled out on the ice and deeper into the water
by boats, saw whales migrating at the times and places scientists assumed they did not.
An expanded study, using sonar and aerial counts, later proved both of the Eskimos'
critiques correct; Population estimates increased from 3000 to 8000 (Huntington 2000).
LEK may even be a source of new models for how to use an environment and its
resource sustainably. Some ecologists have noted that many indigenous communities
seem to have developed sustainable resource management techniques; that is, they are
able to harvest resources without compromising the health of the ecosystem they depend
on (Berkes and Folke 1998)2. Many of these practices are adaptive- that is the
communities' resource use responds to changes in the environment. The Maasai tribe of
2 This is more often the case in self-regulated communities (typically indigenous groups), which have, over
long periods of time, developed management techniques that are culturally internalized in certain rules or
taboos. This is less likely to be the case in regulated communities in the first world.
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Kenya, for example "widen the radius [of grazing] around wells progressively as the wet
season advances, so as to leave enough forage around the wells for the dry season"
(Niamir-Fuller 1998). Overall, this adaptive grazing regime has been found to preserve
the healthy functioning of the African grasslands under variable climactic conditions,
while simultaneously meeting the resource needs of the community (Berkes et al. 2000).
LEK also has ramifications for the social and political aspects of management:
The recognition and use of LEK may reduce resource management conflicts and improve
communication among scientists, managers, and resource users. When LEK is not written
off as "anecdotal," but accepted as a legitimate knowledge system alongside scientific
knowledge, resource users may be less likely to attack the process (or the science) and
more likely to approve of the resulting policy decisions. Calheiros et al. (2000) found this
to be the case in their study of participatory wetland research in Brazil.
Local Ecological Knowledge and U.S. Natural Resource Management:
Opportunities and Challenges
Given the history of resource management in the U.S., integrating LEK into the
knowledge base with which management decisions are made could address a number of
the problems of conventional resource management. It is certainly not a cure-all. For
example, improving the quality and accuracy of the knowledge base used for
management decision-making does not directly address how decisions are made, and with
what values-precautionary and protective or cornucopian-or in whose interest they are
developed. However, in theory, LEK could provide a balance to the top-down, broad
scale vision of conventional management. Considering and integrating LEK could bring
to the fore important local ecosystem dynamics, impacts and other nuances, which are
typically overlooked with the conventional approach. By supplementing the management
knowledge base, the vision of management could become more holistic, as well as more
responsive and sensitive to " local practices, concerns, priorities, and sensibilities" (Davis
and Wagner 2003). Finally, by acknowledging that resource users and other local
communities "know," and treating that know-how as legitimate and credible, policy
makers could reduce some of the conflict, anger, and political stalemates that surrounds
current management decisions (Robertson and McGee 2003).
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Furthermore, although the conventional approach to management is still dominant
in the U.S., there has been a clear shift over the past decade toward new paradigms, such
as ecosystem-based management and adaptive management. Ecosystem management
recognizes that management must be approached more holistically by taking into account
ecological, social, and economic linkages and their relevant scales, while adaptive
management suggests that management be treated as an experiment, with continually
learning and readjustment (Holling 1978). Both approaches recognize the importance of
managing and monitoring at different spatial and temporal scales. Ecological research has
shown that activity and events at fine scales can have effects that ripple outwards and
impact the system at much broader scales (Levin 1992). However, given that current
management institutions and their management vision and tools were developed under
the Enlightenment program paradigm and typically focus on a single scale, such as a
single species, it is unclear how this shift will be made; with limited time and resources,
how will agencies be able to monitor activity and feedbacks at the various scales these
new approaches demand? The integration of LEK could be essential to this endeavor.
Resource users are privy to fine-scale information and events that large-scale monitoring
misses. If this information could be integrated with the current coarser scientific data, a
more comprehensive picture of the system could emerge to guide management decisions.
Its putative benefits notwithstanding, in reality, LEK is rarely used (Bart 2006,
Huntington 2000). As Huntington (2000) has written LEK is frequently discussed in the
future tense: LEK "'will be of use,' somewhere, sometime." Using LEK presents a
number of challenges. As one writer has noted, its important not to get "too dewey eyed"
over LEK as it-like scientific knowledge-it is sometimes wrong (Edwards 1998), and
there are many examples of "traditional" communities destroying their environment
(Diamond 2005). Furthermore, because it is a mix of discrete chunks of knowledge, as
well as theories, methods, and expertise, all unwritten and unevenly distributed in a
community, it is far more challenging to obtain and understand than knowledge that is
codified or quantified. Thus to "use" LEK for decision making, rigorous (and often time-
consuming) qualitative methods (such as questionnaires, interviews, or workshops) are
typically developed and applied to locate, elicit, substantiate, and document LEK
(Huntington 2000, Robertson and McGee 2003). Huntington (2000) argues that a mixture
of resistance to using these social science methods, to working with "non-experts," and
general "inflexibility" to changing the modes of operation have prevented the acceptance
of LEK.
In the U.S. these barriers also exist, but equally challenging is the fact that
numerous statutes require that management agencies use only the "best available science"
and technical reasoning when promulgating their environmental regulations. As Ozawa
(1996) notes, these requirements are intended to serve as a form of "accountability": "As
long as decision-makers [are] constrained by the technical experts' interpretations of the
physical conditions and alternative actions," Congress assumes that "raw politics," or the
interests of a few, cannot intervene and corrupt the development of laws to protect the
good of many. Whether or not these requirements produce the desired disinterested
rulemaking, they have important implications for the use of LEK in management: To be
perceived as useful to natural resource management and policy in the U.S., LEK has to be
integrated into a scientific framework-one guided by established scientific methodology
that, generally, entails observing phenomena, formulating and testing hypotheses for
given phenomena, and recording the process. In the following, I present two U.S. case
studies, and seek to build on the ideas explored thus far by examining how and why, in
each case, LEK was-and was not-integrated into the relevant management science,
and to what affect.
THE SONORAN DESERT CONSERVATION PLAN
Introduction
This case looks at the role of LEK in the development of a conservation land
system (CLS), the backbone of Pima County, Arizona's sweeping Sonoran Desert
Conservation Plan (SDCP). The case illustrates how the team of scientists charged with
designing the reserve was able to design a more accurate CLS by incorporating the LEK
of individuals with varying levels of connection to the scientific community. However,
the case also shows how scientists determined what LEK was useful and credible by
defining an expert community, based on a shared scientific literacy as well as common
conservation values. Two major barriers discouraged the scientists from directly drawing
on other sources of LEK. The first barrier was a language divide: because most "non-
expert" LEK was communicated in non-scientific language, scientists could not
understand its relevance nor confirm its accuracy. The second barrier was that of
conflicting interests: although local ranchers had some of the most extensive LEK in the
County, much of it quantified, they were also the SDCP's most vocal; scientists saw the
potential risks of including ranchers' knowledge (particularly risks to the team's
perceived credibility) as outweighing the potential benefits to their knowledge base.
Furthermore, some ranchers did not want to reveal their LEK to scientists for fear that it
would be used against them. Finally, the case demonstrates how certain individuals with
a foot in both the local and scientific communities could bridge the language divide and
serve as translators. However, the inability for conflicting interests to be overcome in a
similar fashion suggests that this the obstacle of conflicting interests may require a more
strategic intervention that directly addresses the risks associated with using and divulging
LEK.
Background
1998, spurred by the Endangered Species Act (ESA) listing of the tiny pygmy
owl, Pima County, Arizona, embarked on a planning process to address growth and
biological conservation in the region comprehensively (Figure 2). Until this time, like
much of the rest of Arizona and the Sunbelt, Pima County had been on a growth binge. In
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fact, since the 1950s, Tucson (the largest city in the County) has been one of the fastest
growing urban areas in the entire country, exploding from a population of around 50,000
to over half a million by the year 2000. All of Pima County lies within the vast Sonoran
Desert, one of the most biologically diverse deserts in North America, and by the 1990s,
an acre of desert was being lost every two hours (The Conservation Fund 2005). The
ESA listing was a wake-up call for the County; many were concerned that the pygmy owl
was going to be for Pima County what the spotted owl was for the Pacific Northwest
(Kloor 2005).
FIGURE 2. Arizona and Pima County (outlined in black).
It was this possibility that prompted the County to consider developing a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP)-the only way to receive some leniency from Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), which prohibits any entity from "taking" (harming,
harassing, killing) a federally listed endangered species or adversely modifying its
habitat.
Few HCPs are developed with long-term goals of environmental protection and
conservation. Instead, most simply seek to avoid the scenario of stalled economic activity
and vociferous conflict between resource users and environmentalists by nabbing the
Section 10 permit that allows species take. Initially, Pima County thought it would be no
different (Behan 2007). However, the combination of growing public demand to curb
sprawl, a shift in power within the Board of Supervisors, which between 1996 and 1998
went from "being staunchly predevelopment to being strongly proenvironent," and a
potent coalition of environmental organizations resulted in a much grander conservation
vision to comprehensively address growth and protect the richness of the surrounding
environment (Layzer 2008). This vision became known as the "Sonoran Desert
Conservation Plan" (SDCP).
When the Pima County Board of Supervisors approved the SDCP in 1998, the
concept represented a fairly unusual "science-based" approach to regional planning that
would use natural "resource assessment.. .as a necessary first step in determining the
urban form" (Huckleberry 2002). The SDCP development process would still spawn a
HCP for a Section 10 Permit, but would also be used to identify the most ecological
sensitive or valuable land in the County and guide growth and development away from
these regions and towards less biologically important ones.
Following its approval, the County established five advisory committees: a citizen
Steering Committee of over 80 self-appointed members of public, a ranch technical team,
a cultural resources technical team, a recreational advisory team, and a science technical
advisory team (STAT). Although all the groups developed final reports and
recommendations for the County, the STAT team was charged with developing the
reserve system of biologically sensitive areas, later called the Conservation Land System,
or CLS, which would form the core of the SDCP and HCP. The County was aware that
similar "collaborative" HCP processes, which brought together industry, scientists,
government, and citizens, were fraught with problems. Some collaborative processes
crumbled from internal conflict before a plan could be formed; others produced plans that
were influenced more by politics than environmental science and were not biologically
protective. Instead of following these models, the County took its cue from the
recommendations of conservation biologists (See: Noss et al 1997) and wanted the
foundation of the reserve to be created without initial consideration of economic or
political constraints, and instead be built on credible science. Thus, STAT was only
composed of scientists (County, academic, and agency) with various, relevant biological
expertise and was co-chaired by two respected local scientists: Dr. Bill Shaw, a professor
of Natural Resources at the University of Arizona, and Julia Fonseca, a scientist with the
County's Flood Control District. For the three years following its formation, the team
would remain insulated-in fact "fire-walled"-from the heated politics that surrounded
that SDCP (Behan 2007).
Incorporating Expert Local Ecological Knowledge into a Reserve Design
At its inception in 1999, the STAT team reaffirmed the County's intent not to
design a reserve simply for ESA legal compliance and a take permit. The team did not
want to develop a plan by doing the bare minimum required by law and simply
"check[ing] off the boxes" needed for an HCP (Shaw 2007). "We had no interest in
providing a loophole to avoid ESA," Shaw has said. STAT instead chose to follow the
spirit of the ESA and adopt a conservation goal: "To ensure the long term survival of the
full spectrum of plants and animals that are indigenous to Pima County through
maintaining or improving the habitat conditions and ecosystem functions necessary for
their survival" (SDCP 2001, 2).
STAT wanted to plan above the "species level", at which the ESA is written, and
protect ecosystem communities and processes-essentially engage in ecosystem
management instead of conventional management-but they needed a starting point.
What they settled on was the following: if they could develop a reserve that would
protect the vulnerable species in Pima County, these species would serve as a surrogate
for the larger picture of biodiversity, and protect other valuable ecosystem elements such
as important biologic communities or genetic diversity (Shaw 2007). Thus STAT would
not only provide a strong foundation for conservation based land-use planning, but it
seemed certain that a permit based on their multi-species HCP would follow.
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Another unusual aspect of STAT's modus operandi was that, although it worked
intimately with the consultant RECON, the consultant was really under the guidance of
STAT, not the other way around, as is more typical (Fromer 2007). This inversion of
usual positions meant that while RECON provided essential supplementary information
and expert vetting of data and models, ran GIS simulations, and wrote most key reports,
STAT provided the bulk of the direction, data and, in particular, the species expertise that
fed the that GIS modeling and reserve mapping.
Because Pima County is extremely large-the equivalent, as locals will tell it, of a
Connecticut, a Rhode Island, and several other small Northeastern states combined- the
ten-member STAT team could not provide all the necessary expertise on its own. As the
team was committed to developing the reserve with the best information and know-how
available, they mined the area for sources of local expertise at every step of the reserve
planning process. As Shaw (2007) has said, they could have "hired a team of experts,
from Harvard or MIT... to apply planning without local knowledge," but who better to
provide information about Pima County and its biological communities than the people
who lived there and worked in the field- many for decades, if not their whole lives?
Shaw himself has worked in Tucson for 33 years and dedicated his research to many
local environmental concerns such as urban wildlife and the socio-politics of its
management.
There is, of course, a difference between getting scientific data and studies from
locals and using their local ecological knowledge, that hard-to-pin down know-how that
arises from a mixture of known facts, experience, and, as one scientist put it, "gestalt"
(Falk 2007). The STAT team did both, and (as will be explained later) the use of LEK
turned out to be a critical component of the reserve design. However, because STAT's
process had to be scientifically defensible in all respects, the "locals" who provided LEK
had to be part an "expert" community. This did not mean that they held PhD, or even that
they were working as a so-called scientist (although many were) - one person who
provided expertise to STAT worked a day job as a parole officer (Fonseca 2007).
No STAT member could explain in any clear terms what gave a person the
appropriate credentials to be considered an "expert". However, they all shared three
important traits. First, these experts had extensive field experience and gained their
credibility through an informal vetting by the scientific and naturalist community in
Tucson and the rest of Pima County. In Pima County, there is an expansive network of
field biologists, ecologists, natural resource scientists and naturalists, working at the
University of Arizona, in government agencies, in educational and research
organizations, or associated with certain societies, such as the Tucson Herpetological
Society. Although they are clustered by species or interest, they are all linked through
their fascination with and dedication to learning about the natural resources and species
of the Sonoran Desert. As part of this network, STAT scientists knew who to go to within
the network for the "best" information.
Second, for STAT to consider someone an expert, STAT also had to perceive that
person as "credible". Although no one said it directly, by using terms like "self-serving"
and "disruptive" to describe people they would avoid, STAT clearly linked credibility to
more than extensive experience and vetted know-how, but also to perceived shared
conservation interests, or, at the very least, neutrality. However, the majority of STAT's
experts, who donated their time, did so because they supported the team's mission.
Third, although not all of STAT's experts were professional scientists they all
understood the language and methods of science and were able to frame their LEK in
scientific terms (Falk 2007). That is, all of them could present and, if pressed, defend
their experiential knowledge in the scientific language of the STAT team. For example,
experts understood the importance of repeat observations for reliability and how to
distinguish significant versus chance phenomena. In this way, the STAT team did not
have to develop a way to elicit or confirm the expert LEK; they could have a peer-to-peer
conversation, and if an expert's experiential knowledge struck them as questionable, the
provider of the information could typically explain, in a common scientific language,
why or how they had developed that understanding.
STAT used expert LEK in several capacities. They elicited expert opinion via
personal interviews while formulating their list of priority vulnerable species (PVS),
around which STAT would design the CLS. STAT also used the expert opinion to assist
in prioritizing vulnerable species from a much longer list of potential vulnerable species.
For example, STAT wanted to screen out species that did not meet certain local criteria-
such as those for whom conservation would best be accomplished elsewhere (RECON
2000)3. The expert LEK provided information on local species' status that could not be
ascertained through available studies or reports.
However, STAT and RECON relied most heavily upon expert LEK for the first
and most crucial stage in the development of the CLS: mapping the land that the
designated vulnerable species needed to survive and persist. In a typical HCP process, the
most straightforward way to do this is to gather existing data on where the species, during
their lifecycle, nest; where they forage; and which corridors they use to travel-
essentially, where they are on the landscape (Fromer 2007). The problem was that for
many of the species the data didn't exist there or was spotty at best, nor were there funds
or time to initiate costly surveys for a 9,000 square mile area. Furthermore, STAT did not
want to overlook areas where species had been in the past, and thus could be in the future
if restoration was undertaken. Instead, STAT and RECON gathered what data they could
and turned to the next best option: habitat modeling.
The habitat modeling STAT and RECON did can be explained in relatively
simple terms (much to their credit). Where a certain species, say a reptile, can persist is
constrained by a number of environmental variables, such as temperature, vegetation, or
rainfall. RECON and STAT chose several environmental variables-including
hydrology, vegetation/landcover, and soil type-that they believed were central to
determining vulnerable species' habitat. They divided each of the variables into sub-
categories, a total of 115 for all. For example, vegetation/landcover was subcategorized:
"mixed-scrub," "creosote bush," "cattail," and so forth. Then they gathered as much of
the most accurate and most detailed spatial data on these variables that they could find
and fed them into a GIS system, creating a map of Pima county with vegetation types,
hydrology, soils, and so forth, all overlaid. They also used the most accurate vulnerable
species data they could find from natural histories and other studies to rate the importance
3 The jaguar, which did not make it to the final Vulnerable Species list, is a good case of this. Although
many environmental groups argued that it should be planned for, it only enters the county periodically and
the majority of its range is in Mexico. After expert review, STAT contended that the conditions in Pima
County had a very limited impact on its survival.
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of each sub-variable (from 1-3) in determining the species' distribution: For the pygmy
owl, "mixed paloverde cacti" (under the variable vegetation) scored a 3 and 401-600 feet
(under the variable elevation) scored a 2 (SDCP 2000). They developed these models for
each species. The idea was, for any particular species, where its most highly rated sub-
variables lined up on the map, the higher the value of that land for its habitat, which
would be delineated by a color gradient across the map.
A favorite argument of the SDCP skeptics, who don't always quite understand
what STAT did, is that the entire habitat reserve is based on "models" and
"extrapolations"-not "reality". Although STAT's habitat modeling and ecosystem
planning was based on well-established concepts from conservation biology, because of
data gaps, such critiques would actually have had some merit had not expert LEK played
such a central role in the mapping. The initial habitat maps, modeled without local expert
input, were fraught with error. One of STAT's experts recalled his reaction when he saw
the first runs of the models for several of the species: "You were getting a negative
image! I mean, maybe they were starting with field guides, but the distribution [of the
species] they were getting was almost the opposite, in some cases, of the actual
distribution." Not all the initial maps were this inaccurate, but STAT and RECON were
well aware that they were working with major data gaps: their vegetation/landcover and
soil data was far less detailed in some areas than they would have liked, and very little
was known about their habitat needs.
To remedy the inadequacy of the data, STAT developed an iterative process,
where they brought in their local experts, who were intimately familiar with the
distributions and habitat needs of the PVS in Pima County, to help critique and tweak the
models. As Mima Falk (2007), a member of the STAT team and the plant ecologist with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, described:
The local expert groups that we brought in were made up of anyone we
knew who was an expert, regardless of whether or not that person was a
quote-un-quote scientist. So, there are a lot of people in Tucson who work
on tortoises and they do not all work in the agencies-or whatever it
means to be a 'scientist'- so based on our personal contacts and people
we know to be knowledgeable, those groups were brought together to look
at the species information and then to have those discussion of: what do
you think is the appropriate habitat here? Are these the parameters to be
looking at?... We tried to bring in a range of people.. .Lots of amateur
people are great at natural history; they see things out there that the quote-
un-quote scientists does not because they are driven by certain questions;
it's really rare to find someone [like that] who sees the big picture...
Once the model was done, it actually came back to the group and we
asked: does this look right, based on what you know about the species? So
there was a lot of information that was used that way: that could not
necessarily be quantified. it was sort of a species expert review, where we
sat down and sort of went on people's knowledge-or gestalt, if you will.
If the distributions of potential habitat appeared "off', the experts would recommend
changes to the models: decrease the value of soil type or weight vegetation more heavily
than altitude. The models would be altered and the maps re-drawn. This was done
iteratively for every species map, blending the technical, data driven GIS model with the
experiential know-how of the local experts, until STAT and the panels were satisfied
(Figure 3).
To add a further dose of reality, a separate team of 19 local experts (all from
agencies, consulting firms or the University of Arizona) added additional layers called
"priority conservation areas" (PCAs). Drawn onto paper maps and then digitized, these
areas were based on their experiential understanding of local conditions and demarked
habitats that they deemed absolutely essential for species persistence.
These finalized maps were then compiled to produce one map, based on where
three or more species' "high quality" habitats overlapped; this became the base map of
the CLS, although other important shaping of the map, such as improving connectivity
between patches, was performed later (Figure 4). And, as they did throughout the
process, STAT, RECON and outside peer reviewers vetted all the information to ensure
accuracy to the greatest extent possible.
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FIGURE 3. Three RECON models of potential habitat for the needle-spined pineapple cactus.
Maps rendered by "high," "medium," and "low" potential habitat. Run "a" was conducted in
November, 2000. Runs "b" and "c" were conducted following consultation with species experts
in January and March of 2001. Run "c" represents the final, accepted habitat model. (Image
source: SDCP 2001)
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By all accounts, STAT's use of expert LEK greatly increased the accuracy of the
CLS mapping effort, and very likely the future effectiveness of the CLS. However, the
development of the CLS still required quantitative modeling. The two perspectives were
complementary. While the extensive local expertise grounded the technical approach in
on-the-ground realities and greatly improved the map's accuracy, the modeling effort
allowed the local experts to consider the potential habitat value of areas they were less
familiar with. The modeling also increased the credibility and defensibility of the map's
development, as it ensured uniformity in approach and also allowed replication--key
aspects of any scientific endeavor
Non-Expert Local Ecological Knowledge: The Language Divide and the Role of a
Translator
Because STAT limited its use of LEK to that of an "expert community", it
represented only a portion of the LEK that existed in Pima County. Although not all the
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experts were professional scientists, they all shared a common conservation culture and
scientific language. In this sense, the LEK that STAT relied on was easy to access and
integrate. STAT had a much more difficult time handling LEK from those outside of its
own expert network, which was proffered through hundreds of phone-calls and at
STAT's meetings, all of which were open to the public. A major cause of this difficulty
was a language divide. For example, non-experts did not have the scientific literacy to
frame their knowledge for scientists, so the LEK they presented was not in scientific
terms, quantified, or even codified; STAT, therefore, perceived the knowledge to be
anecdotal and therefore unusable. The language divide was also manifest in the public's
frequent misinterpretations of the team's research methodologies. Citizens who were
earnestly interested in contributing their biological knowledge rarely possessed enough
scientific training to understand STAT's assumptions, scope, procedures, or goals. Thus
the LEK locals offered was rarely directly useful or relevant to STAT's work. For
example, many locals had detailed information pertaining to a very small land area,
whereas STAT was modeling over an enormous land mass; locals would tell the team
about the biological richness of 15 acres, while STAT was looking at an area of 5.9
million acres and a specific 56 species.
Although the STAT team recognized that some of the information locals offered
might have been credible and valuable, there were risks associated with attempting to
bridge this language divide. STAT would have had to thoroughly investigate each of the
locals' claims before accepting them. With limited time and budget, the effort of
confirming the LEK's accuracy, coupled with possibility it would be inaccurate, made
such ventures risky and impractical.
Citizen informants were similarly discouraged from attempting to translate their
knowledge into scientific language, as it would have required considerable investment of
time and money: they would have to attend STAT meetings, understand STAT's process,
and possibly hire or have access to a scientist or surveyor to complete a study, write a
compelling report, and so forth. The investment required was beyond most individuals'
capacity. Furthermore, it was not guaranteed that such an effort would have any impact
on STAT's work. In fact, in the hopes that their local knowledge would be incorporated
into STAT's modeling, several conservation-minded local groups developed scientific
reports and funded local land assessments for STAT review. However, none of the
handful of these community-developed reports influenced STAT's CLS-either because
STAT was already aware of the information, or, more often, because the study was not
relevant to STAT's pre-determined scope and methodology.
However, a method did emerge to bridge the language divide: Several of STAT's
species experts worked with non-expert locals when conducting field research and acted
as "translators" between the two communities and their knowledge bases. Among Pima
botanists, birders, and other field researchers, many of whom were STAT experts,
tapping local knowledge was not unusual. Researchers and naturalists spoke to locals
when in the field, or maintained relationships with a handful of informants who supplied
them with information and field updates. One botanist described these informants as a
small group of people that she could call up and ask: Have you been out in the field
recently? What has been going on out there? What have you seen? In addition to
providing LEK, these informants were useful to researchers because they were not
burdened by institutional paper work and could circumvent the "red-tape" that may face
government or academic researchers (Caldwell 2007). Furthermore, local informants
were frequently provided access to private lands, such as ranches, that may be closed to
government employees. Because STAT relied so extensively on local experts, these
experts also were passively providing entry points for non-expert LEK to filter up in a
form that was scientifically framed and credible, either as scientific studies or embodied
in the expert's own knowledge and judgment, to inform STAT's work.
For example, one of STAT's experts was Phil Rosen, a professor at the University
of Arizona who studies reptiles and amphibians in Southwest Arizona. From the year
2000 and on, he has worked in an urbanizing region of Tucson, southwest of downtown,
known as the West Branch. He went to the area following a lead on a very rare lizard--
the giant spotted whip-tail, one of STAT's priority species-and his presence piqued the
interest of a small coalition of long-time residents who had been working with little
success to protect the West Branch ecology, first from flood control engineering and then
from encroaching development. A handful of the group's most vocal members
established a rapport with Rosen and provided him with several types of LEK. One
particularly valuable form was historical. They were able to tell Rosen the story of the
landscape's natural history: what had happened on the land that may have had effects that
he was interested in. This was detailed information he could not have acquired anywhere
else and assisted him in formulating causes for ecological change and restoration
strategies. A second form of LEK was "location specific knowledge": Since the locals
knew the area well, they were able to help Rosen locate particular animals, plants, or
landforms. For example, during the first summer Rosen worked in the West Branch, he
was with one of the neighbors and heard a specific toad call; the neighbor able to take
him through the clearing to where she knew toads were living. Sometimes he would show
her a picture of a particular species, and she would recognize it and be able to catch it for
him (Baker 2007). A final type of LEK that the locals offered was real-time information
on changes in the system or species: When Rosen was working on a frog study, some
informants who had become interested in his study would call him up to tell him when a
breeding explosion had occurred, which he could not know from his office or home.
When I asked one of the West Branch informants if she and the neighbors knew
that specific species, such as the whiptail lizard, were in her environment, she explained:
"We didn't know the nitty gritty; we saw the area as a unit... We saw what would happen
when developers would go in and scrape out two feet of soil; we saw the erosion and the
flooding... It was our home, and we knew it was an unusual area and had many plants and
animals were being destroyed elsewhere; we didn't need to do a study to know what was
there and that it was valuable" (Baker 2007).
Rosen, however, was able to bridge the divide in how he and the locals learned
and thought about the landscape, and draw out their knowledge through informal
interactions such as conversations or assisted fieldwork. As Rosen (20007) put it: "I
learned to know what they know... [and] it facilitated the work I had to do out there,
which was to document the natural history and conservation status of the species." At the
same time, Rosen taught them about the ecology of the area, the names and natural
histories of species, and educated them about how, as a scientist, he worked; through this
co-teaching they established a common language and understanding. In this way, Rosen
was able to incorporate LEK into his scientific research.
In 2001, Rosen and a plant ecologist completed a detailed survey of the area, and
confirmed what the neighbors had been arguing for decades, though not in the scientific
terms or comprehensive framing that Rosen was able to articulate. Within the nearly 2-
mile stretch of the community's wash, Rosen found a host of important riparian plant and
animal species, including two more vulnerable species. When 15 acres of the river
bottom was slated for use as a bus barn, Rosen and his studies were instrumental in
preventing the construction. Instead the land, and many other parcels, were purchased
with mitigation funds for conservation, and will connect to several Priority Conservation
Areas in the CLS.
Non-Expert Local Ecological Knowledge: Ranchers and the Challenge of
Conflicting Interests
A language divide, however, does not explain why STAT never tapped the
knowledge of the community with the most extensive LEK: Pima County ranchers. As
anthropologists, managers, and even a few STAT experts attested, it would not be an
exaggeration to say that the ranchers of Pima County know their land inside and out.
Although some of the ranchers have only recently acquired their business, often as a
lifestyle choice, a number of outfits are multi-generational; some are even run by
descendants of the original homesteaders, who claimed territory when the West was first
opened to settlement. Particularly in the latter case, where families have been on the land
since the late 1800s, ranchers have acquired substantial ecological know-how, pertaining
to a landscape that may span 50,000 acres. In addition to understanding its history and
landscape scale changes, they have a practical, day-to-day, knowledge of the land's
elements, species, and dynamics. Ranchers have had to manage the land through drought,
under federal regulations (particularly the Endangered Species Act), and with the ever-
present threat of environmentalists' lawsuits. Furthermore, this knowledge applies to the
nearly one-third of the county that qualifies as ranchland: a mosaic of private land, as
well as State Trust and Federal land that is grazed in accordance with grazing leases.
To explain why STAT did not draw on ranchers' LEK, scientists instead offered
two main reasons. First, they suggested that the ranchers' knowledge was related to land
management, and not useful for the design of the CLS, which largely required species
related expertise. Second, they argued that ranchers' interests in supporting a cattle
business (and not biodiversity) biased the type of knowledge they had. There is certainly
truth to both these statements. Unlike researchers, ranchers are land managers, and they
have historically managed the land for a commodity: beef. And they have not always
even done a good job managing for that. By the late 1890s, the cattle industry had so
degraded the range that cattle starvation was common, and the effects of erosion from
overgrazing are still visible. Furthermore, many unsustainable practices are still in use
today, and some scientists even question whether ecosystem health and cattle grazing are
compatible goals in semi-arid grasslands (Layzer 2006).
These issues aside, ranchers did have knowledge-some of it quantified- that
STAT was interested in using. For example, a coalition of ranchers in the Altar Valley,
the County's largest, unfragmented land mass, had been working with the Natural
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) to improve range productivity, restore degraded
areas, and document landscape health and change. The ranchers had internalized much of
this information, but the NRCS conservationists had also worked with ranchers to
quantify and record it. The STAT team expressed interest in accessing some of the
NRCS' rangeland data, which included landcover mapping and repeat photographs.
However, privacy laws prevent the NRCS from divulging information, even that
collected on public lands, without a rancher's permission. Once STAT realized this, they
ceased pursuing the data.
The fact that STAT was only willing to work through the NRCS for data on range
conditions suggests that the reason STAT did not draw on ranchers knowledge had less to
do with the type of knowledge ranchers had, and more to do with the type of interests
ranchers represented: Along with developers, ranchers were the primary public critics of
the SDCP, and, from their perspective, they had numerous reasons to be skeptical. In
general, ranchers value privacy, are wary of government regulation, and are averse to
policies that threaten to undermine their property rights. Most ranchers are also land rich
and money poor. While few approve of encroaching development, ranchers
simultaneously recognize that should their businesses fail, the land and its development
rights are their "nest-egg." The SDCP, and thus the STAT team's work, appeared to be a
threat on all these fronts. In particular, it would reduce the possibility of intensive future
development in the majority of ranchlands, which, with their lack of fragmentation and
riparian corridors, are some of the County's most biologically rich regions. Additionally,
ranchers perceived the SDCP to be unduly influenced by environmentalists, and feared
that STAT would recommend the removal of cattle from public lands- as several
locally-based environmental organizations, such as the SW Center for Biodiversity, had
been doing for decades. Ranchers were heatedly engaged in the Steering Committee's
political battles, and were staunch opponents of environmentalists, arguing for a far less
protective version of the CLS. In a scenario that is likely to be repeated across the U.S.,
the holders of one of the largest funds of LEK-the resource users-were the same
people who were liable to politically oppose any attempts to regulate or place restrictions
on the resource.
Thus, although no scientists said it directly, STAT believed that including
ranchers and their LEK in the science of the CLS was a risky enterprise. In particular,
because ranchers were adversarial advocates, STAT could not credibly draw on the
ranchers' LEK. Scientists further perceived the risk of politicizing their work after
struggling to maintain their political "fire-wall." STAT was forced to weigh potential
risks and benefits and, as one scientist obliquely said: "In this case, the principles of
transparency and accountability may be more important than new information."
Because of the risks scientists perceived, there were scant ways to bridge the
divide between the ranchers' LEK and the management science. Unlike a language
divide, conflicting interests could not be overcome through translation, as risk was
embedded in the very act of eliciting and using the LEK. Thus, even efforts to translate
ranchers' knowledge into "objective" scientific reports introduced interest-related risks.
Although it was important for ranchers to make sure that the STAT team was working
with accurate data (they were particularly frustrated when they perceived mistakes in
species or landcover mapping on their own land), some were wary of revealing their own
hard data, particularly related to endangered species, in the chance that it could be used
against them. STAT also faced the difficult decision of whether or not to use scientific
studies that they had not commissioned, especially when offered by individuals who
might be motivated by self-interest. For example, in 2000, several members of the Altar
Valley Alliance shared a resource assessment (vegetation and soils) with the STAT team
that provided much finer-scale data than STAT had been using. As one STAT scientist
noted: " If the data had come from one rancher, we probably would not have taken it, for
the same reason we would not take a developer commissioned environmental assessment
and just plug it in." Ultimately, the STAT team accepted the assessment because it was
conducted by an individual who known to the STAT team and deemed "credible."
Discussion
In this case I have argued that the scientists charged with developing the CLS
were able to design a more accurate CLS by drawing on LEK. However, the LEK that
scientists used was drawn a defined expert community who shared a scientific language
and conservation interests. The case revealed thus two major obstacles to integrating
LEK into management science: language divides and conflicting interests. Both obstacles
introduce risk into the act of drawing on or attempting to communicate LEK; in the case
of the language divide, risk is associated with the effort required to bridge the divide,
either through scientists spending time and resources to work with locals and understand
and confirm LEK, or through locals trying to express their LEK in scientific terms. This
case suggests that one way this effort and risk can be overcome is through a "translator"
who can bridge both communities. However, the process of translation that is revealed in
this case is passive. That is, locals were not able to actively translate their LEK, nor was
STAT able to actively seek out LEK. The communication and integration of LEK hinged
entirely on one individual and his or her decision and ability to draw out LEK from a
local community or individual. Though revealing of the characteristics required to
accomplish LEK translation, the bridging that occurred in this case is somewhat tentative.
This case also shows that even if translation methods are developed to bridge the
language barrier, such methods cannot bridge the conflicting interests (between scientists
and resource users) that are likely to arise wherever natural resources are being extracted.
59
Conflicting interests involve very different risks than language divides. As shown in this
case, risk is perceived to be embedded in the very act of sharing knowledge and
interacting: scientists fear their science will be politicized and resource users fear their
LEK will be used in ways they cannot control and that are potentially harmful. This
suggests that to incorporate LEK from locals with different interests than scientists,
incentives must be created through structural or systemic changes to overcome these
risks, or align the communities' interests. This was not accomplished in Pima County, but
it is unclear if such an effort would have been beneficial to the SDCP. Given that the
scientists had only one opportunity to develop a CLS, an act with even the slightest risk
of compromising the research would, and probably should, have been avoided. The
following case, however, begins to suggest how conflicting interests in other instances
might be overcome and with what outcomes.
THE NEW ENGLAND GROUNDFISHERY
Introduction
This case study examines role of LEK in fishery management throughout the
latter part of the 1900s, as groundfish stocks in the Gulf of Maine declined precipitously
and conflict between scientists and fishermen raged. The case demonstrates how
advancements in fishery science and technology and increasingly precautionary science
and rule-making created both a language, and, in particular, an interest divide between
fishermen and scientists that prevented fishermen's LEK from being incorporated into
management science-although the region has had a rich history of cooperative research.
The case further shows how these divides have been, and are being, bridged. As was seen
in Pima County, this case demonstrates that an individual with a foot in both the local and
scientific world can act as a translator between the two communities' knowledge bases,
and can bring to light new visions of ecological systems by drawing on LEK. However,
this case also begins to provide a model for how interest conflicts between scientists and
locals can be overcome. This model is provided by the collaborative research initiatives
that have been developed in the Gulf. These initiatives have created incentives for
cooperative research and aligned scientists and fishermen's goals in joint research
projects, thus overcoming many of the risks that have prevented such cooperation in the
past.
Background
Tucked between the coastlines of Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts and the
underwater shallows that sweep off Cape Cod and eventually rise to form George's Bank,
lies the Gulf of Maine (Figure 5). For thousands of years its waters supported one of the
world's richest fishing grounds, sustaining pre-American tribes, and later the European
settlements that by the 1 9th century would grow into New England's wealthy coastal
communities. Among the Gulf's many marine riches, the catch that fishermen most
coveted were the abundant groundfish, a complex of bottom dwelling species including
flounder, haddock, halibut and-most prized of all-cod.
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FIGURE 5. Gulf of Maine. (Base map courtesy of: The United States Geological Survey/Woods
Hole Field Center)
Aside from several narrow international agreements, for the majority of the 2 0 th
century there was no comprehensive federal strategy to manage the Northeast fisheries-
or, for that matter, any marine resources outside of state waters. However, the need for
management of the vast commons was evident as early as the 1930s. At this time,
technological advances in the fishery, such as the introduction of trawling vessels,
coupled with increasing seafood demand began to expose the edges of the seemingly
limitless system, in the form of several temporary commercial extinctions. Then in 1950,
enormous foreign factory ships from Asia and Europe began to enter the Gulf. These
vessels could stay out on the water for many months to years, and engaged in a
systematic targeting of abundant species, gradually working their way down the food-
chain (Murawski 2001). For the next two decades, concern among New England
fisherman escalated to a fever pitch as they witnessed systems-wide declines in stocks
and demanded that the U.S. government take action. By the time Congress responded
with the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (also known as
the Magnuson Act), groundfish stocks had collapsed, in some cases to less than 30% of
their original numbers, and were followed by massive declines in essential prey, such as
herring and mackerel (Murawski 2001).
With the Magnuson Act, Congress legislated a number of major changes in U.S.
fishery management. First, the Act expelled foreign boats from the Gulf of Maine and
other waters by demarking an exclusive fishing zone within 200 miles of all U.S.
coastlines. Second, it sought to grow and modernize the nation's fishing fleet by
providing financial incentives. And third, it established a comprehensive framework for
U.S. fishery management and research intended to support the twin goals of
environmental and economic sustainability. Specifically, the Act mandated that
management measures "prevent overfishing while achieving.. .the optimum yield from
each stock" and simultaneously " be fair and equitable to all fishermen" while
minimizing "adverse economic impacts on such communities" (Magnuson Act 1976). To
carry out this mission, Congress created eight regional fishery management councils, to
be composed of state and federal managers, scientists, and industry. The councils would
manage and develop regulations for their local waters, while the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) a federal agency in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, would ensure regulatory compliance and provide stock assessments and
projections.
Crisis and Conflict
In the Northeast, the Magnuson Act succeeded in relieving the pressure of foreign
fleets in the Gulf of Maine; however the financial incentives, such as government backed
boat-building loans, worked far too successfully. In fact, banks were so eager to provide
these loans, that some fishermen would joke that if one "opened a savings account, the
bank would either give you a free toaster or a free fishing boat; and they were all out of
toasters" (Dobbs 1999, 104). The New England fleet quickly ballooned to fill the place of
the Asian and European ones, and was soon catching nearly double what NMFS scientists
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deemed sustainable (Dobbs 1999, 59). Meanwhile, the New England Fisheries
Management Council (hereafter "the council"), overwhelmed by the complexity of
balancing both environmental and economic wellbeing in an uncertain social and
ecological landscape, acted slowly and clumsily (Dobbs 2000, Murawski 2001).
Furthermore because the council was composed largely of industry interests, who knew
"a lot more about catching fish.. .than marine biology or natural resource management,"
members were reluctant to impose too stringent regulations (Layzer 2006, 255). The rules
the council did promulgate were met with ire among fishermen, who saw them as too
harsh and unfairly "democratic," as they applied equally to all fishermen, even those with
different gear and boats sizes. The regulations were also met with consternation among
scientists, who argued that they were inadequate. As the actors argued and the council
waffled, the groundfish stocks plummeted.
The changes wrought by the Magnuson Act and the deteriorating conditions in the
groundfishery produced another unfortunate and inadvertent outcome that only
exacerbated the mismanagement of groundfish stocks: fishermen were pitted against
government scientists and the gap between the two communities and their knowledge
bases slowly widened. This had not always been the case. Although by the 1980s and
1990s few could imagine it, in the early half of the 1900s, scientists frequently worked
collaboratively with fishermen. Such partnerships were borne both out of necessity-
fishermen had the boats scientists needed to conduct their research-as well as their
common interests in more productively exploiting the Gulf's seemingly infinite marine
resources. Furthermore, scientists recognized that fishermen's expertise, based on
decades of inherited and experiential knowledge, was unparalleled. Fishermen had, and
continue to have, extensive LEK, some of which is passed down through family-lines, or
shared laterally among fishing colleagues. Fishermen know where fish congregate, seek
cover, spawn, and migrate, and how fishing practices or specific equipment affects this
behavior. They have knowledge about interactions between species and with their habitat.
They know bottom depths, type (rocky or smooth) and cover (eel grass, sponges, sand
dollars) over vast areas-largely from what their nets pull up or get caught on. They are
also aware of cycles of change and have knowledge about historical baselines that may
precede scientific data collection. Some of this information is written down in detailed
logs; most is stored into fishers' minds and integrated into their practices (Hall-Arber and
Pederson 1999, Pederson and Hall-Arber 1999, Dobbs 2000, Ames 2006). Thus, at a time
when the Gulf was a virtual unknown to the scientific community, fishermen knew it
quite well. And some of the regions' greatest marine scientists, such as Henry Bigelow,
who conducted the first, and still cited, scientific investigations into the Gulf, relied on
fishermen's accounts and expertise to supplement and confirm his findings (Hartley and
Robertson 2006, Dobbs 2000).
However, the passage of the Magnuson Act inspired several developments that
presented two major challenges to the integration of fishermen's knowledge in fisheries
science. The first development occurred in fisheries science and the ways and means by
which scientists and fishermen learned about and understood the Gulf diverged: By
requiring the unit of management to be single-species stocks, over their "full range", the
Magnuson Act encouraged the narrow path of research that scientists had recently
embarked on: estimating, modeling, and predicting stock sizes and composition (i.e.
"stock assessments"). In 1963, NMFS scientists, working out of the New England
Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC), initiated the first groundfish trawl survey. Surveys
were conducted bi-annually (using identical procedures for statistical accuracy) and the
resulting data was input into mathematic models to produce NMFS' stock assessment.
Because of Magnuson's science-based standards and the council's need for immediate
answers on how many fish were in the Gulf, and how many could be removed
"sustainably", these assessments became the primary scientific analyses on which the
council made and explained their management decisions (Dobbs 2000). In turn, NMFS's
research budget shifted away from "biological science, gear research, and extension
activities" to support the surveys and the increasingly complex and statistically rigorous
assessment models, leaving fishermen with "few opportunities to contribute the
knowledge they possessed" (Hartley and Robertson 2006).
In addition to being angered by the abstruse nature of NMFS's models, fishermen
also found fault with the vision of the natural world that underlay them; it was a vision
that was utterly at odds with fishermen's own understanding of the Gulf's dynamics.
NMFS models assumed a system linearity, a predictable, causal relationship between
fishing effort and population size. They also assumed a relatively "constant context"
across a broad-scale (Acheson et al. 1998, Smith 1995). Fishermen saw things much
differently. Far more attuned to fine-scale phenomena and system interconnections,
fishermen argued that NMFS methodologies and approach were misguided and even
mistaken.
At times fishermen's complaints were a result of misunderstanding how the
scientific models corresponded to what fishermen saw on the water. For example, during
early 1980s, NMFS assessments showed a serious decline in stocks, while fishermen,
boosted by "Magnuson-driven fleet modernization" continued to have relatively
consistent catches (Hartley and Robertson 2006). As NMFS' claims did not match their
experience on the water, fishermen took what was really a relic of technological
advancement to mean the assessments were wrong. However, fishermen also noted
problems that would later be reiterated by scientists, even within NMFS itself). For
example, they argued that NMFS' models misunderstood and downplayed the effects of
localized events-behavioral and distributional changes in stocks and small-scale
disturbances-and wrongly ignored interactions between generations as well as between
species. Furthermore, they complained that scientists' (and managers') assumptions about
fishermen's practices were wrong. For example, gear changes, did not always work as
expected, or solved one problem while creating another. However, fishermen's expertise
was rarely presented in scientific terms and frequently challenged NMFS' scope of work,
thus, for NMFS, the relevance of the information fishers provided as well as its accuracy
was uncertain. Instead, NMFS deemed fishermen's LEK "anecdotal" and subjective.
In addition to the widening divide between how fishermen and scientists
envisioned and understood the Gulf and its fish populations, a second development in the
latter half of the 1900s further divided the groups: NMFS scientists became far more
precautionary in their analyses and recommendations (Layzer 2006). While many
fishermen continued to cling to the belief that the Gulf's resources were inexhaustible, or
simply resisted any attempt to limit their activities, scientists-witnessing yearly declines
in their stock surveys-argued for the NEFMC to impose stricter conservation measures.
The days when fishery scientists and fishermen were united in a mission to maximize
exploitative effort and efficiency had long past. Thus, in addition to being separated by a
language divide, the expertise of scientists and fishermen was shrouded by mutual
mistrust. Scientists viewed fishermen and their LEK with suspicion: how could
fishermen, who were facing large economic losses from regulation, possibly be
"objective" in their analysis of stock conditions? (Wilson 2007). Fishermen on the other
hand, accused NMFS of using bad science to try and put them out of business.
Any hope for collaboration between industry and scientists appeared dashed by
the events of the 1990s. In 1991, the Conservation Law Foundation sued the Secretary of
Commerce 3 for failing to protect New England Groundfish from overfishing: In 50 years,
the Gulf of Maine cod stock had declined by 90%, and represented less than a 2 0 th of the
biomass extant in the 1850s (Hartley and Robertson 2006). Overall groundfish biomass
levels were at their lowest in two decades and would continue to decline to an all-time
low in 1999 (NMFS-cite). The lawsuit "empowered conservation minded-oriented
managers on the council and within NMFS" and effectively put an end to the influence
that industry had wielded over the Council (Layzer 2006). Any channels, via Council
representation or congressional intervention, that may have existed for fishermen to
influence decisions or offer their expertise shut-down. The Council turned to NMFS'
scientists for guidance, and all rules were submitted to NMFS lawyers before they were
promulgated (Hall-Arber 2007). Beginning in 1994, the Council began passing
exceedingly strict regulations, compensating for 20 years of inadequate action. While
deemed necessary by NMFS and the Council, the rules were economically disastrous for
many small fishing fleets and coastal communities. Council meetings devolved into grim
events where industry attendees shouted, wept, and threw punches and unleashed their
frustration on those "bearing the bad news"-the scientists-inflaming an already
adversarial and defensive relationship (Dobbs 2001). As the journalist David Dobbs has
written: " In the blurring of boundaries and denial of limits that the spectacularly
dysfunctional council process encouraged, [the] louder angrier sector of the fishing
community didn't want to bother distinguishing between NMFS's science and policy
branches, and found some pleasure in the idea of killing the messenger" (Dobbs 2001, p.
60).
Bridging Visions of the Gulf: Mapping Historic Cod Spawning Grounds and
Migration Patterns with LEK
Not everyone believed that the visions of fishers and scientists were as
irreconcilable as Council meetings or industry diatribes in the widely read National
Fisherman suggested. Some contended that fishers' LEK could complement fishery
science, and vice versa. For example, NMFS assessments accurately perceived changes at
the broad-scale, they ignored potentially significant local nuances and phenomena-the
type of information that was embodied in fishers' LEK. At the same time, fishers'
conclusions were often skewed by their limited view of the system; this explained why
some fishermen were convinced that fish populations were growing, while others
believed the stocks were virtually wiped-out (Wilson 2007). The application of scientific
methodology to fishers' insights was necessary, particularly if the ideas were to be useful
to the council, which was required to abide by the Data Quality Act and Magnuson's
mandate that regulations be based on "best available science."
As seen in the Pima County case study, the individuals who saw both the potential
for using LEK in fishery science and the means to translate it into science straddled both
the world of the locals and the world of the scientists. As intermediaries, they could see
the relevance of LEK and the value of applying it in fisheries science. Furthermore, as
intermediaries, they understood how to bridge the language divide that plagued New
England fishers and scientists in the 1990s, and blend the two groups' expertise.
One such individual was Ted Ames, a life-long New England fisherman and
lobsterman, from a family of fishers that went back 250 years to Stonington, MA, as well
as a trained scientist, with a master's in biochemistry and a nearly completed PhD in
Oceanography. Ames disagreed with those who discounted fishermen's LEK as
"subjective," "anecdotal," and generally of little use except as an "historical footnote"
(Wilkinson 2006, Ames 2006). Ames was also critical of those who claimed (as a
National Research Council report did in 1999) that the crisis in the groundfishery was the
result of "too many fishers chasing too few fish." Although he agreed that a high catch
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rate had led to the decimation of groundfish stocks, he also believed that the statement
simplified the complexity of managing a sustainable fishery. In particular, Ames was
interested in how the lack of historical baselines and consideration of fine-scale changes
in populations may have "aggravated attempts to manage New England's commercial
fisheries," and how the LEK of fishermen, which, he argued, provided the only source of
"local, historical, place-based fisheries information," could begin to fill those gaps (Ames
2006).
In the mid- 1 990s, Ames embarked on research that would fuse his background in
science, his decades on the water, and his interest in improving the sustainability of the
groundfishery. It started in 1994, when he joined a state commissioned study, looking at
the feasibility of establishing several cod and haddock hatcheries in Maine's in-shore
waters, where groundfish populations had collapsed in the 1950s and, curiously, failed to
rebuild, even as off-shore populations rebounded. His commission found that a more
efficient approach would be to release young fish into once productive spawning grounds
and nursery sites. There was, however, one large obstacle: no one knew where those
grounds were. They had been "fished-out"-effectively cleared of fish-decades before.
As he pondered a solution, Ames began to think about the grounds he and other
fishermen had fished out in the 1970s, and realized that by interviewing retired fishermen
(fishers of his father's or grandfather's generation), he could patch together their
knowledge of relic spawning grounds and potentially identify the disappeared sites. In the
late 1990s, Ames received funding to complete such a study, and began to track down
and interview fishers.
Had Ames simply been a scientist, he may have had a much harder time gathering
the information he needed for his study. But because he was a fisherman, he was able to
communicate in a common tongue and knew to use media that fishers would be familiar
with, such as nautical maps to elicit data. Because of his fishing experience, Ames also
understood the effects different gear types would have on catch; he knew, for example,
that cod do not feed when they are spawning, thus fishermen who used trawlers, which
drag nets through the water, would provide better data on spawning sites than hook and
line fishermen (Ames 2006). He was also prepared for certain challenges that someone
from outside the fishing community may not have been, and was able to respond
appropriately. For example, when he began, Ames did not know the names of retired in-
shore fishermen but was able to draw on his connections with several coastal groundfish
organizations to recommend and locate relevant fishers (Ames 2006).
Although his background as a fisher was vital to his recognizing the potential of
LEK and the means to responsibly and efficiently elicit it, Ames' training as a scientist
and his connections to the local scientific community gave him the tools he needed to
undertake a rigorous study and convey his findings in a manner that would resonate with
scientists and managers. Ames carefully validated his data; he only recorded sites that
were independently identified by more than two fishers and that also bore physical traits
that were characteristic of cod spawning grounds. He further verified his work with other
scientific research, such as studies of extant spawning grounds and sonar scans of the
ocean bottom, which he found lent credence to his interviewees' LEK. Finally, his work
was assisted and peer reviewed by some of Maine's leading ecologists (Dobbs 2000).
At the study's end, Ames had identified over 2,800 km2 of cod and haddock
spawning grounds from fishers' LEK, over half of which were no longer active (Ames
1997). The work further established that cod and haddock had once spawned "along the
length of the Gulf of Maine's coast" (Ames 2006). In addition to locating these forgotten
sites, the research offered clues to why the coastal spawning grounds had never
rebounded, and instead blinked out. If cod, like salmon, exhibit site fidelity-that is they
only return to their birthplace to spawn-once a spawning site is fished-out, it will
remain so, perhaps indefinitely. Other populations will not move-in to repopulate, and the
empty grounds can not be "reseeded by eggs floating in from elsewhere.. .as the Gulf's
current pattern prevents eggs laid offshore from finding their way into the bays" (Dobbs
2000).
In 2001, Ames discovered research by the fisheries biologist Joe Wrobelewski
that confirmed belief that cod were faithful to their birth-site and returned there, year
after year, to spawn. With this confirmation, the LEK collected from his previous study,
and several other early data sources, he began developing what he would later refer to as
a "proto-type database for Atlantic cod from fishermen's knowledge" (Ames 2006).
Essentially, he set out to "reconstruct the Gulf of the past" (Wilkinson 2006). Using the
spawning grounds of the 1920s (when cod populations were healthier) as "points of
origin", Ames was able to track the seasonal movements of the Gulf of Maine cod during
that time (Ames 2006). What he found was startling. Although NMFS divides the cod of
the Gulf of Maine into two stocks, Gulf of Maine and George's Bank, and the council
develops regulations based on this model, the migration patterns in Ames' mapping
showed three distinct sub-populations that moved from spawning grounds to feeding
grounds in annual cycles (Ames 2004).
Drawing on the LEK of fishermen, Ames has produced another vision of the Gulf,
one that takes into account the system nuances that heretofore have been absent from
fisheries science. The growing influence of systems ecology in the fisheries, with its
attention to scale and non-linearities, has only increased the importance of his work.
Should his conclusions find wide acceptance, they have substantial implications for
fishery management. While the Gulf of Maine cod have been managed as one
homogenous stock, Ames' findings suggest that such management will fail to detect and
account for local extinctions, and perpetuate the fishery's decline. Ames, number of other
scientists, as well as several fishers' and environmental organizations have lobbied the
council to institute what is referred to as "area-based management", which would divide
the gulf into three separate management regions corresponding to the three cod sub-
populations. Although the council had thus far refused to agree to this option (Wilson
2007), the plan would create:
... three ecologically discrete subdivisions... accessible only to fishers who
agreed to fish in one of the areas for five years, making it imperative that
they would develop a good rebuilding program...harvesting [would] be
restricted to modest levels that allow the development of a sustainable
fishery that provides long-term benefits to the local economies of the area
(Ames 2006, 360).
Shifting the Incentive Landscape: The Return of Collaborative Research and the
Aligning of Interests
Although Ames' research supported fishers' claims that their knowledge could
"help manage a fishery if it was collected with appropriate rigor and judgment,"
individuals with his translation skills were rare. Furthermore, the research of Ames, and
other intermediaries like him, could not address on a large-scale the systemic failures that
had led to the dysfunctional relationship between fishermen and scientists. Efforts to
translate LEK could not overcome the interest and value conflicts that continued to divide
scientists and fishermen; indeed it is notable that Ames relied primarily on retired
fishermen's LEK, as active fishermen were far less likely to participate in scientific
research studies, often out of mistrust and fear that information could be used against
them. By the late 1990s, this breakdown in relations had revealed the need to find ways to
productively deal with divergent visions and work towards re-establishing trust. In 1998,
for example, a National Research Council panel of independent fishery scientists
(directed by Congress to investigate the accuracy of NMFS's science and assessments),
produced the report: Review of Northeast Fishery Stock Assessments. Even as they
exonerated NMFS scientists of industry charges of scientific inaccuracy, the panel also
cited the need to "improve relationships and collaborations between NMFS and
harvesters by providing, for example, an opportunity to involve harvesters in the stock
assessment process and using harvesters to collect and assess disaggregated catch per unit
effort data" (NRC 1998).
The conflict was not only taking its toll on the scientists and fisher communities,
but congressmen and women were increasingly fielding complaints from industry
interests and acting as "referees" to the conflict, while litigation had become the primary
tool of environmental groups, as well as industry and concerned citizens, to challenge
council decisions (Goethel 2007). NOAA accounted for well over 50% of all lawsuits
filed against government agencies, and NMFS had created a "tailored fisheries litigation
database to track the thousands of cases" it received (Hartley and Robertson 2006,
Goethel 2007).
In recognition that something needed to be done, in the late 1990s, Congress and
NOAA initiated two major funding programs that shifted the incentive landscape to favor
collaborative research and the integration of LEK into a scientific framework. The first
program was established through a $5 million dollar emergency relief effort, passed by
congress to assist New England fishers after the council instituted rolling closures across
the Gulf. Largely due the wise political maneuvering of Senator Judd Greg of New
Hampshire, the relief fund transformed from a "check-writing exercise" to the "linking of
economic assistance with collaborative research" (Hartley and Robertson 2006). In 1999,
the operation coalesced into what is now known as The Northeast Consortium (NEC).
Through the input of a multi-stakeholder advisory committee, the NEC established four
main objectives. In addition to its original goal of providing economic relief to industry,
the NEC sought to: foster partnerships between fishers, researchers, and managers;
enable the participation of industry in research; integrate LEK and fishery science; and
equip commercial vessels for research and monitoring use (Hartley and Robertson 2006).
In 1999 the Northeast Regional Office of the NOAA Fisheries Service established a
similar funding program to support collaborative work within the agency and regional
council. Known as the Cooperative Research Partners Program (CRPP), the goal of the
program is to establish cooperative partnerships to "enhance the data upon which fishery
management decisions are made as well as to facilitate communication and collaboration
among New England commercial fishermen, scientists, and fishery managers" (NOAA
2006).
The introduction of collaborative research programs created incentives that have
encouraged many fishermen and scientists to engage in cooperative scientific assessments
of the Gulf. These programs have accomplished this by making the benefits of
cooperative research outweigh the risks that were frequently associated with such work.
The first incentive these programs provide is financial. Fishermen are drawn to the
economic support provided through the grant money-NEC funding, for example,
mandates a 75%-25% split between industry and researchers, respectively. Scientists are
also drawn to the funding, but even more attractive is the easy access to a research
platform. Chartering vessels is the most expensive part of oceanic research, and through
these programs the fishermen partners provide the research boats (Goudy 2007).
Another incentive is the opportunity for fishermen to offer LEK and for scientists
to have access to it. Because involvement in the research is also voluntary, the scientists
and fishermen who work together choose to do so, and are often equally invested in the
research. Thus their goals and interests are aligned and both parties exercise control over
the experiment and the use of knowledge in it. This aligning of interests and sharing of
control reduces risks to both the scientists and fishermen. For scientists, the risk that their
work will be politicized by conflict is enormously reduced. Furthermore, because
fishermen have control over how their knowledge is used, they are less protective of their
hard-earned LEK and more willing to share and apply it in research. By overcoming the
risks associated with conflicting interests, collaborative research permits a freer exchange
of knowledge, where benefits can accrue through the eliciting and divulging of LEK.
Of course not all the collaborative projects offer equal opportunities to integrate
fishermen's expertise. In some cases, the extent of the collaboration goes no further than
scientists and fishers sharing the same vessel (Atkinson 2007). However, even in some of
the more "top-down" projects, such as NMFS cod-tagging program, where fishers have
had almost no role in shaping the scope or methods of the project, LEK plays a vital role:
fishers know where the fish are, when they will be there, and how and where to set the
gear (Goethel 2007).
However, on the other end of the spectrum, a number of projects, particularly
those funded by the NEC, are actually driven by fishers' research questions. When
fishermen-as opposed to NMFS-are able to determine the research questions and
scope of the project, a new vision of the Gulf, with potentially important management
implications, can materialize. For example, the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen's
Association (CCCHFA), an association established by a group of hook fishermen (some
of whom are also scientists) in 1991, is active in a number of NEC and CRPP funded
collaborative projects. Every one of their studies integrates fishermen's input in initial
brainstorming, the design, execution, analysis, reporting, and management
recommendations (Parker 2007, Rudolph 2007). In 2001, they initiated a study on herring
populations based on a local fisher's concern that populations were declining and may be
impacting the cod that feed on them. In another study, funded by the CRPP, at the urging
of a local fishermen, CCCHFA teamed up with scientists from the NMFS' New England
Fisheries Science Center to examine possible genetic differences between spawning cod
in the east and west parts of George's bank. The result of the study found that the two
spawning components were genetically distinct, indicating that they be separate sub-
populations.
Discussion
This case confirms many of the findings from the Pima County case. Two similar
obstacles to integrating LEK in management science emerge. The first is a language
divide that has developed as fisheries science has become more complex and inaccessible
to fishermen. The second obstacle is that of conflicting interests, which so often arises
between precautionary scientists and more cornucopian resource users (Layzer 2006). As
seen in Pima County, this case has shown that individuals, who straddle both the
scientific and local world and can translate between them, has been able to overcome
these divides between the fishing and the scientific community. However, as seen in the
previous case, the translator is in control of what question is asked, how the scope of
research is defined, what methods are used, and how results are interpreted. For others
involved, the process is a passive one.
This case has also provided a model for how interest conflicts between scientists
and locals can be overcome. This model is provided by the collaborative research
initiatives that have been developed in the Gulf. These initiatives have created incentives
for cooperative research and aligned scientists and fishermen's goals in joint research
projects, thus overcoming many of the risks that have prevented such cooperation in the
past. However, a number of questions remain. First, although cooperative research has
indeed succeeded in creating incentives that encourage and support collaborative
enterprises between fishermen and scientists, it is not a stable, self-sustaining
arrangement. In fact, it is currently uncertain if money will be available from the NEC for
future projects (Goudy 2007). As one of the largest funders of collaborative of research,
this could be a major blow to the future of collaborative research in the Gulf.
Furthermore, the introduction of collaborative research does not change the management
structure with which so many fishermen find fault. Indeed, it is the management structure
itself that makes sharing some of the most valuable LEK risky. Fishers can provide real-
time information, based on what they see and experience on the water, which is some of
the most useful information to have in management. However, the current management
regime has established competition between fishers and discourages them from sharing
this short-scale knowledge. With this in mind, a more lasting way to overcome
conflicting interests might be what Ames and others have in mind: an area-based
management regime where fishers exercise a form of "property rights" in the commons
and are actively engaged in management. In this case, fishers might be more encouraged
to share real-time LEK and work with scientists to maintain a sustainable and healthy
fishery.
CONCLUSION
Conclusions: A Summary of the Findings
The case studies analyzed in this thesis confirm the theory regarding the benefits
of incorporating LEK into resource management science. In both Pima County and the
Gulf of Maine fisheries, LEK supplemented and at times corrected management science;
in the New England Groundfishery, LEK also provided new visions of the Gulfs
ecological system that may eventually lead to more nuanced and sustainable
management, based on the system complexity that LEK is revealing. This will, of course,
also depend on the values that guide management decisions, and specifically whether or
not rulemaking remains precautionary. Accurate knowledge and nuanced understanding
alone can only help, not create, a healthy fishery.
However, my goal in analyzing these cases was to understand why LEK is so
infrequently used in practice: what is preventing scientists on the ground from using
LEK? And when scientists do draw on LEK, why do they choose to do so and how do
they overcome the related obstacles. Indeed, understanding what are the obstacles to
using LEK should be the first step in developing ways to increase its accessibility and its
incorporation into management science. The conventional wisdom in most LEK literature
is that "language" is the major obstacle preventing the uptake of LEK in management
science. With this belief as an operating assumption, many researchers have already
begun to develop methods of eliciting and translating LEK. This study confirms that a
language divide presents an obstacle to incorporating LEK into management science. The
language divide prevents scientists from recognizing the relevance or accuracy of LEK,
and with limited time and research budget, scientists rarely can afford to invest energy in
understanding and confirming LEK. From the standpoint of untrained locals, scientific
methods and assessments are often too complex and time-consuming to understand, and
they are unable to engage productively in the research. This study further shows how
individuals with standing in the both the local and scientific communities can translate
across this divide.
But this study also demonstrates that if one hopes to facilitate the integration of
LEK into management science, simply developing methods to overcome the language
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divide is not enough. The knottier challenge to incorporating LEK into U.S. natural
resource management science is that of conflicting interests between scientists and locals.
As the case analyses demonstrate, such conflicts are to be expected between those who
extract resources-and have some of the most extensive LEK-and the scientists
responsible for advising managers on how that extraction should occur. Whereas resource
users tend to hold utilitarian values and resist any attempts to limit their access to the
resources they extract, natural resource scientists have become increasingly precautionary
and conservation-minded over the past several decades. Such contradictory interests and
values make knowledge sharing a risk-incurring exercise for both scientists and resources
users. And unlike the risks associated with bridging the language divide, these risks or
potential costs are not related to the effort required to undertake translation; rather the
risks are embedded in the very act of working together and sharing knowledge. Scientists
fear that by involving adversarial resource users they will politicize and compromise their
science. Resource users fear that if they divulge LEK, it will be used to limit their access
to resources, or somehow compromise their livelihood.
The case of the New England groundfishery provides one model for overcoming
the obstacle of conflicting interests. It shows that in order to do so, incentives must be
provided that make knowledge sharing and cooperative work beneficial, and
simultaneously reduce the potential risks involved. The cooperative research programs in
the Gulf of Maine ingeniously achieved this shift in incentives by providing financial
incentives, supporting research alliances between fishermen and scientists, and
encouraging the alignment of fishermen and scientists' interests in service to the research
projects goals. There are drawbacks to this model. They include the programs' financial
instability, as well as its inadequacy in addressing the problems of the Gulf's
management structure. However, the program does offer a model for how one might shift
incentive structures so that benefits of cross-community work outweigh the associated
risks.
It is worth reiterating the point that more LEK is not always better. There are
instances when LEK is wrong, where it does not provide desired benefits, or where the
risks involved in incorporating it may outweigh potential gains. However, given the
conclusions of this thesis, the following section presents a number of policy
recommendations for different institutions and individuals who may be interested in
expanding the availability and use of LEK in natural resource management.
Policy Recommendations for Agencies
I. Establish the right incentives
This is the most fundamental recommendation for management agencies.
Incentives must be established that provide benefits and overcome the risks
associated with collaborative work. What these incentives are may depend on the
communities involved. However, incentives may include, but are not limited to,
financial incentives for collaborative research; written assurances that locals will
control what happens with their knowledge and how it is interpreted in studies in
policy; financial support for time locals spend with scientists or on projects; and
written agreements between scientists and locals that outline expectations and
commitments.
II. Foster relationships between agency scientists and locals
The more scientists interact with locals, the more knowledge they gather and the
more they dismantle barriers of mistrust that inhibit cooperation. Agency
scientists in Pima County provide an excellent model for this type of close
engagement: Many of the of them work in the field and speak extensively with
locals, as well as the naturalist organizations that network with locals.
Furthermore, agencies can foster these relationships through partnership
programs, such those as run by the Natural Resource Conservation Service that
work with ranchers on common projects, such as range restoration and the
documentation of landscape health and function.
II. Involve local field scientists in management research programs
Many agencies have field scientists who have already established strong bonds of
trust and understanding with locals, particularly resource users. These scientists
are vital links to the local community. In Piina County, for example, the field
scientists who served as STAT's experts also served as conduits to the larger local
community and could facilitate the interaction between the communities. It is
important to have at least one such individual engaged in management programs.
IV. Establish methods to store the LEK that is acquired
Not all LEK can be codified and still retain its meaning. However, it is important
that the knowledge that is acquired through interactions with locals not disappear
when the agency employee or local leaves. A number of institutions have
established LEK oral history projects, which collect oral histories related to the
ecology of important sites. Histories are recorded and stored for future research
and reference. Published research papers written on collaborative research or LEK
may also serve a similar function.
Recommendations for Resource Users and Other Bearers of LEK
I. Be assertive about needs and requirements
Individuals with LEK should be clear about what they need to feel comfortable
sharing LEK (e.g. what written agreements, what form of compensation, and what
role in the research or policy formation they need) as well as what expectations
they have for how that knowledge will be used. Establishing requirements early
will prevent misunderstanding and also ensure that LEK is put to use in a manner
with which its originator feels comfortable.
Recommendations for Academia
I. Train knowledge translators
This study has illuminated the need for individuals who have the ability to
straddle scientific and resource dependent communities and clearly translate
between them. This suggests a need for academies to train individuals who are
versed in science, ecology, mediation, and anthropology. Such individuals would
be essential to facilitating the translation of LEK and its integration into
management science.
I. Train scientists to work with locals
Although scientists in most universities are now taught the skills of knowledge
translation for the purpose of educating the lay public, they should also be taught
to use the public as a resource. That is, biology students could be educated about
LEK, what its benefits are, and how to elicit it. LEK from locals could then be
integrated into research projects. At the University of Arizona, some professors
are already doing this. For example, in one study of roadrunner distribution, part
of the methodology for mapping the birds included setting up an answering
machine for the public to call in sightings. After a day the machine had to be
thrown out; it had filled to its capacity of 500 messages (Shaw 2007).
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